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JOHN B. MITCHELL*
Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Dementia: The Impossibility of a
Workable Regulatory Regime
Creating a physician-assisted suicide (PAS) regime for cancer,
ALS, I and AIDS is relatively easy. While to be human is to be a
"being-unto-death," 2 meant to suffer from the terminal malady of
mortality, as a community we are comfortable with the notion that a
distinct meaning adheres to the category of "terminal illness."3  And
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I "Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a progressive, adult-onset motor neuron
disease characterized by loss of motor function and ultimately death." KATHRYN BAYLES
& CHERYL TOMOEDA, COGNITIVE-COMMUNICATION DISORDERS OF DEMENTIA 130
(2007).
2 See Michael Bavidge, Ageing and Human Nature, in DEMENTIA: MIND, MEANING,
AND THE PERSON 41, 50 (Julian C. Hughes et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter DEMENTIA]. The
characterization of man as a "being unto death" initially comes from the philosopher
Heidegger. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1980).
3 See Howard Brody, Assisted Suicide for Those Not Terminally Ill, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 7, 7 ("The factual point is a reminder that the term 'terminal' has
very limited medical utility and significance.").
For example, under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act it is unclear whether the
definition of terminal is meant to be with or without treatment. JOHN KEOWN,
EUTHANASIA, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGISLATION 167,
171 (2002); see also Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 44-45
(1996). Further, over fifty percent of Oregon doctors say they cannot predict whether a
patient will die within six months. See KEOWN, supra, at 172. But see Yale Kamisar, The
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while physicians may lack confidence in their abilities to predict
when one with such an illness has less than six months to live 4 (as is
the accepted timeline in current and proposed PAS statutes5), this
does not bother society. Their prediction will be close enough for
government work literally as hospice care is available under Medicare
only when one has ceased all curative therapy and has been diagnosed
with less than six months to live.6 Maybe the patient will live longer,
maybe less. But barring a rare miracle, they are going to die soon.
Leave them alone. The diagnosis of "six months to live," while if
pushed analytically may be revealed as a metaphor rather than a literal
chronological measure of time, nonetheless presents to the world an
appearance of a noninterpretive bright line: six months is six months,
June to December.
Interestingly, neither of the two primary metaphors weaving in and
out of the current PAS dialogue-"death with dignity"' 7  and
"unbearable suffering" 8
-correlate strongly with six months to live.
"Right to Die": On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 504 (1996)
("'Deciding what should count as terminally ill will pose such severe difficulties that it
seems untenable as a criterion for permitting physician-assisted suicide."' (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
4 See KEOwN, supra note 3, at 172.
5 For example, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the equivalent, recently passed
Washington statute require that the patient be "diagnosed with a terminal illness that will
lead.to death within [six] months." JOHN B. MITCHELL, UNDERSTANDING ASSISTED
SUICIDE: NINE ISSUES TO CONSIDER 90 (2007); see Janet 1. Tu, Assisted Suicide Measure
Passes: Initiative 1000, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A3. Likewise, the failed
California Compassionate Choices Act required an "incurable and irreversible disease"
that would "within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months." A.B.
374, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
6 See 42 C.F.R. § 418.20 (2009) (providing eligibility requirements for hospice care
under Medicare); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (b)(l) ("The certification must specify that the
individual's prognosis is for a life expectancy of [six] months or less if the terminal illness
runs its normal course.").
7 This right is alleged to sound in autonomy. John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke,
and Assisted Suicide: The Real Constitutional Right, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 57
(2006). The right has alternatively been described as the "ight to die," ALAN MEISEL,
THE RIGHT TO DIE 3-12 (1989), the right to "choose and to control the time, place,
conditions, and manner of dying," MARGARET SOMERVILLE, DEATH TALK: THE CASE
AGAINST EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 31 (2001), and "death with
dignity," Callahan & White, supra note 3, at 20; Martin Gunderson & David J. Mayo,
Altruism and Physician Assisted Death, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 281, 284-87 (1993); see also
Mitchell, supra, at 57-60 (surveying the various notions of "dignity").
8 Unlike the Oregon statute, see generally MITCHELL, supra note 5, the Netherlands
based access to assisted death (or "euthanasia," as they refer to it) on the concept of
"unbearable suffering." See KEOWN, supra note 3, at 108-10; ROBERT I. MISBIN,
EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY 69, 72-73 (1992).
[Vol. 88, 1085 '
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"Death with dignity" is, as the phrase states, about the manner of
one's death. People react to the narrative-tubes, soiled adult
diapers, 9  complete dependencel°-and become upset beyond
comprehension. But nothing in that story correlates with "terminal
illness" conjoined with "six months to live." The metaphor of
"unbearable suffering," in contrast, is a function of living. While the
public discourse about unbearable suffering rests primarily upon
images of rampaging physical pain," "suffering" is far more complex
Problematically for those seeking to confine the scope of PAS under an unbearable
suffering standard is that suffering encompasses far more than physical pain. See E.
Emanuel et al., Evaluating Requests for Assisted Suicide, in EUTHANASIA:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES COMPANION 49, 50-51 (Lisa Yount ed., 2002) ("Loss of control,
fear of abandonment or burdening others, financial hardships, physical and psychological
symptoms, and personal beliefs are all potential causes of suffering."). See generally
DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL DEATH
100-02 (2000); Nathan I. Cherny & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of
Refractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10 J. PALLIATIVE CARE
31, 34 (1994) ("The approach suggested in the evaluation of unrelieved physical
symptoms becomes more difficult if symptoms are psychological or suffering is perceived
to relate to existential or spiritual concerns."); Harvey M. Chochinov & Leonard Schwartz,
Depression and the Will to Live in the Psychological Landscape of Terminally Ill Patients,
in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO END-OF-LIFE CARE 261,
298-302 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE CASE AGAINST
ASSISTED SUICIDE]; Stacy DiLoreto, The Complexities of Assisted Suicide, 34 PATIENT
CARE 65, 69 (2000); Herbert Hendin, Suicide, Assisted Suicide, and Medical Illness,
HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Jan. 2000, at 4-7; Zbigniew Zylicz, Ethical
Considerations in the Treatment of Pain in a Hospice Environment, 41 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNSELING 47, 47-53 (2000). In fact, the Dutch have approved euthanasia for extreme
psychological suffering. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 83.
9 See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 60.
It is this latter narrative, this dying without dignity, which the proponents of PAS
sought to prevent. In this bad death narrative, the person is in pain and soiling
himself, with tubes and machines humming away . . . . Why must a patient
endure this? Why can the patient not exercise his autonomy and choose to end
this mockery of his existence with the assistance of a physician through PAS?
To permit less denies them the right to die with dignity.
Id. (footnote omitted).
10 See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 22 (2006).
The fact is that human beings come into the world with a passion for control,
they go out of the world the same way, and research suggests that if they lose
their ability to control things at any point between their entrance and their exit,
they become unhappy, helpless, hopeless, and depressed .... And occasionally
dead.
Id. (footnote omitted).
11 See, e.g., DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE,
POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT-TO-DIE MOVEMENT 57 (1998); Paul van der Maas & Linda L.
Emanuel, Factual Findings, in REGULATING How WE DIE: THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND
2009]
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than physical pain, including the psychological, emotional and
existential aspects within its ambit. 12 Again, a person with a terminal
illness and six months to live may suffer great pain, and some
certainly do, but not invariably so.
So, what is going on? Acceptance of PAS reflects intuitions about
the entitlement of autonomous individuals to try to influence some of
the details of the otherwise inevitable. The attitude is: "I know I'm
going to go, but I'd like to go in my own small way if I can."' 3 Still,
those intuitions cannot be wholesale inserted into the concrete reality
of social life without concern about cabining their scope. In short,
counterintuitions tell us that we do not want to sanction at-will PAS.
So our choice is "terminal" plus "six months." This limitation neatly
circumscribes the scope of PAS under circumstances that serve as a
comfortable proxy for the death with dignity and unbearable suffering
metaphors. As I previously mentioned, cancer, ALS, and AIDS are
easy; dimentia is not.
The debate over PAS will face the greatest complexities and
challenges concerning PAS and dementia. 14 As shall be shown,
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 151, 157 (Linda L. Emanuel
ed., 1998) (stating that "less than [ten] percent of cancer cases involve untreatable pain").
12 See supra note 8.
13 See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 61.
14 Dementia will not be the only contender for expanding the scope of PAS beyond the
"terminal, six months to live" framework. On a conceptual level, the question has been
raised whether respect for autonomy and the desire to end suffering-the moral values
allegedly underlying PAS--can be confined to terminal illnesses. Id.
To suggest that all competent adults have the right to physician assisted suicide
would be startling to most. The fact is that over time, it may be difficult to limit
PAS's use to those we now envision as terminally ill and suffering. First,
assuming we can even define who is and who is not terminally ill, , . . it will not
be reasonable to confine the right to only the terminally ill. . . . Non-terminal
patients suffering as the result of massive injuries or those inflicted with a
wasting disease can, in some ways, be in a far worse position than those with a
terminal illness, e.g. six months or a year to live. The suffering of non-terminal
patients can go on and on, while, for the terminally ill, the end is in sight.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Wasting diseases, such as Parkinson's, and severe disabilities will
likely also be raised as candidates for PAS. Of note, former Governor Booth Gardner,
who is suffering from Parkinson's disease, led a successful campaign in Washington State
for an Oregon-like PAS law. See Daniel Bergner, Death in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 40. In fact, the majority of those seeking the assistance of
Dr. Jack Kevorkian had degenerate, rather than terminal, illnesses. See Brody, supra note
3, at 7. The challenge will be to establish a method for deciding when such a person may
be entitled to PAS. The time from first diagnosis to substantial physical degenerations
may be many years. What metaphor should be chosen to give sufficient clarity to when
the line justifying access to PAS has been crossed? Physical disabilities bear significant
issues in addition to the need to develop an acceptable metaphor to describe the physical
[Vol. 88, 1085
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dementia is not capable of neat definitions or bright lines comparable
to "six months to live." "No hard scientific boundary [separates]
disease [dementia] and [normal aging]."' 5  Instead, dementia is a
syndrome 16 during which a person suffers from "multiple cognitive
deficits sufficient to interfere with social and occupational
functioning." 17  Yet there can be no doubt that dementia is
accompanied by at least as strong an image of "loss of human
dignity" and "suffering" as accompanies cancer. I have some
personal sense of this. My mother had dementia. She lived in an
Alzheimer's residence, and died from Alzheimer's disease.
In considering PAS and dementia, one faces issues of significant
scale, both numerical and conceptual. Numerically, four-and-a-half
condition qualifying the individual as a candidate for PAS. The disability community has
consistently expressed apprehension concerning the legalization of PAS. For example, "a
long list of state and national disability rights organization [sic]" joined other
constituencies in opposing California's proposed PAS law. See Californians Against
Assisted Suicide: For the Third Time in Three Years, Assisted Suicide Fails to Get Support
in the Assembly, BIOTECH WEEK, June 27, 2007, at 976. See generally Timothy H.* Lillie
& James L. Werth, Jr., End-of-Life Issues and Persons with Disabilities: Introduction to
the Special Issue, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 2 (2005). Underlying the disability
community's opposition are two concerns. First, PAS currently would take place within a
societal context where the lives of the disabled are perceived to be worth less than the lives
of the nondisabled (a so-called "ablest society"). See, e.g., Ron Amundson & Gayle Taira,
Our Lives and Ideologies: The Effect of Life Experience on the Perceived Morality of the
Policy of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 53, 55 (2005) (stating
that some caregivers believe the seriously disabled would be "better off dead"); Rhoda
Olkin, Why I Changed My Mind About Physician-Assisted Suicide: How Stanford
University Made a Radical Out of Me, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 68, 70 (2005)
(stating that "people without disabilities judge the quality of the lives of people with
disabilities more harshly than do the people with disabilities themselves"); James L.
Werth, Jr., Concerns About Decisions Related to Withholding/Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Treatment and Futility for Persons with Disabilities, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y
STUD. 31, 32 (2005) (noting that people with disabilities are often considered to have a
poor quality of life).
Second, that same ablest society continues to deny the disabled the support and material
resources needed in order to live a life fulfilled. See Paul K. Longmore, Policy, Prejudice,
and Reality: Two Case Studies of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y
STUD. 38, 38-44 (2005) (showing how discrimination regarding access to services led
quadriplegics to seek PAS); Richard Radtke, A Case Against Physician-Assisted Suicide,
16 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 58, 58 (2005) (observing that an "unsupportive
environment" can cause the disabled to underestimate the potential for a decent quality of
life).
Without massive efforts to educate the public about the disabled, along with
corresponding changes in public attitudes and increased provisions for needed material
resources, this strong opposition will likely continue.
15 Julian C. Hughes et al., Seeing Whole, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 1, 2.
16 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 3.
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million Americans currently suffer from Alzheimer's disease,18 the
leading cause of dementia in older adults. 19  By the middle of the
century (unless a cure is found 20 ) as many as fourteen million adults
may suffer from Alzheimer's disease.2 1 In comparison, 10.8 million
people in this country had some form of cancer in 2004.22
Alzheimer's, moreover, causes only a little over half of all
23 24dementia. Vascular (i.e., strokes) dementia, Lewy body
dementia, 25 Pick's disease, 26 other rarer causes, 27 and so-called
18 LYNDA A. MARKUT & ANATOLE CRANE, DEMENTIA CAREGIVERS SHARE THEIR
STORIES: A SUPPORT GROUP IN A BOOK 3 (2005); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
189 (1993) (stating that one quarter to one half of those over eighty-five are seriously
demented); NANCY L. MACE & PETER V. RABINS, THE 36-HOUR DAY: A FAMILY GUIDE
TO CARING FOR PERSONS WITH ALZHEIMER DISEASE, RELATED DEMENTING ILLNESSES,
AND MEMORY LOSS IN LATER LIFE 7 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that there are an estimated
"[four] million people in the United States [that] have some degree of intellectual
impairment"); Alison Phinney, Living with Dementia from the Patient's Perspective, J.
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, June 1998, at 8, 9 (estimating that eight percent of
individuals sixty-five and older in North America, Europe, and Asia have dementia).
Those over eighty-five comprise the fastest growing segment of our population. See
DEREK HUMPREY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE, POLICIES, AND THE
RIGHT TO DIE MOVEMENT 9-10 (2000).
19 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2. Note, however, that the .only way to
diagnose Alzheimer's disease with certainty is through an autopsy. See MACE & RABNS,
supra note 18, at 293.
20 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 298-311 (describing current research);
Carmelo Aquilina & Julian C. Hughes, The Return of the Living Dead: Agency Lost and
Found?, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 143, 148-49; see also Roger Bullock, New Drugs
for Alzheimer's Disease and Other Dementias, 180 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 135, 135-39
(2002).
21 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2; Stephen G. Post, Severely Demented
Elderly People: A Case Against Senicide, 38 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 715, 715 (1990). In
fact, these numbers may understate the truth. A recent Mayo Clinic study indicates that an
additional one million older Americans suffer a "milder type of mental decline that often
precedes Alzheimer's." -See Marilyn Marchione, US. Facing "Crisis" of Millions with
Pre-Dementia, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 29, 2008, at A5.
22 See AM. CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfmalsecured.pdf.
23 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 1;
MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 290 (discussing that Alzheimer's comprises fifty to
sixty percent of dementia cases).
24 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2, 83.
25 Id. at 2, 105.
26 For a description of this rare brain disorder, see MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at
4.
27 Dementia can also be the result of Down syndrome, BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra
note 1, at 75-76; Parkinson's disease, id. at 93; Huntington's disease, id. at 115;
[Vol. 88, 1085
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"mixed" dementias 28 (e.g., vascular disease and Alzheimer's disease
combined) will only add to the number of adults with dementia.
The conceptual aspects of PAS and dementia will likewise play out
on a large scale. The dialogue over assisted suicide for the terminally
ill currently revolves around notions such as dignity, sacredness of
life, autonomy, and slippery slopes. While such concepts will retain a
place in any consideration of PAS for the demented, they will not
reside at the center. Rather, at the core of this dialogue will be
competing, complex narratives--constructed from cultural lore,
philosophy, and medicine-over the extent to which the demented are
full human beings, entitled to be valued as such. For the more those
suffering dementia are placed in narratives where they are "no longer
the same person," or lacking "the prerequisites of being human," or
mere "empty shells," the easier, for the tremendous individual,
29 3familial, and societal burdens °  of dementia to outweigh the
frontotemporal dementia, id. at 123-24; ALS, id. at 130; or AIDS, MACE & RABINS,
supra note 18, at 294-95.
28 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2.
29 If the family members act as the caregivers, the toll on them is often overwhelming.
See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 118 (discussing the importance of support
groups for family members functioning as caregivers); Lisa Brodoff, Planning for
Alzheimer's Disease with Mental Health Advance Directives, 17 ELDER L.J. 239, 240
(2010). The literature is filled with descriptions of the stress on caregivers. MARKUT &
CRANE, supra note 18, at 160; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note I, at 219-24:
MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 235-36. Intertwined with emotional stress are the
huge economic pressures accompanying the care of the demented.
Total healthcare costs are more than three times higher for people with
Alzheimer's and other dementias than for other people age 65 and older ....
People with Alzheimer's are high consumers of hospital, nursing home and
other health and long-term care services, which translates into high costs for
Medicare, Medicaid and millions of families. As families struggle to survive in a
deepening recession and as states grapple with budget shortfalls, Alzheimer's
disease threatens to overwhelm them both....
•.. In addition to the unpaid care families contribute, the report also reveals that
Alzheimer's creates high out-of-pocket health and long-term care expenses for
families.
Press Release, Alzheimer's Ass'n, New Report Says Alzheimer's Disease and Dementia
Triple Healthcare Costs for Americans Age 65 and Older (Mar. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.alz.org/national/docments/release . 032409_factsfigures.pdf.
30 The current yearly cost to society of dementia is estimated to be one hundred billion
dollars. BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 3. For a discussion of the nature and scope
of the current stress on the health care system, see generally BILL BYTHEWAY, AGEISM
52-55 (1995) (describing the presence of panic in a culture that the elderly will use up
health care resources); SOMERVILLE, supra note 7, at 13; PAUL STARR, The SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION
20091
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concern for the fate of the demented person. On the other hand,
narratives positioning the demented as persons who, while perhaps
diminished, remain fully human make it difficult to relegate this
group to the realm of instrumental, cost-benefit analysis.
Attaining the latter situation is vital. Put simply, it is impossible to
create a workable, legal regulatory regime regarding PAS and
dementia. Due to a fundamental paradox, consent is not possible, and
use of living wills to resolve this issue will inevitably result in
delegating unbounded discretion, as was once possessed by monarchs,
over the life or death of the demented person. But cultural blinders in
the form of the myth of "the empty shell" impair our ability to see
clearly the horrors that could accompany permitting PAS for
dementia. Rebuffing this myth, however, cannot be limited to the
standard academic methods of analysis and authority, though there is
much of that in this Article. It also requires a visit into the day-to-day
world, what some would call reality. The call to reconceptualize the
demented must be more than thoughtful and reflective; it must be
vivid. To that end, at various points in this Article I tell stories about
my mother and her life with dementia.
Part I of this Article explores the neurophysiological effects of
dementia on the interrelated processes of memory, cognition, and
language. The section then explains how the neurological damage
associated with dementia manifests in the daily life of the dementia
sufferer. Part II faces the myth of "the empty shell" head on-
exploring the myth, debunking it, and then explaining the need to
curb the self-fulfilling institutional dynamics of "malignant
positioning." Finally, Part III directly confronts the impossibility of
creating a legal regime that can acceptably regulate PAS and
dementia.
AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 378 (1982); Dieter Giesen, Dilemmas at Life's
End: A Comparative Legal Perspective, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 200 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED]; Sheryl A. Russ, Care of the Older Person: The Ethical Challenge of
American Medicine, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 87, 88 (1989).
[Vol. 88,1085
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I
THE SCIENCE AND RESULTING EFFECTS OF DEMENTIA
A. The Science of the Brain
Dementia results from damage to the "neural architecture" of
various areas of the brain. As a disease such as Alzheimer's breaks
down various aspects of the structure of brain cells, 32 deficiencies in
assorted neurotransmitters (chemicals that send messages from one
cell to the next 33) appear.
The brain is the center of the interrelated processes of language,
memory, and communication.34 Language is a system of symbols
used to communicate; 35 the system itself is composed of different
varieties of knowledge.36  The dementia sufferer will experience
different language deficits depending of the site of the neurological
damage.3 7
Linguistic communication requires more than access to language.
It is also a result of cognition; specifically, it is a cognitive process of
38
sharing ideas through language. Cognition, in turn, implicates
stored knowledge as well as the processes for making and
manipulating knowledge. The human brain is a pattern recognition
39 40system. This system thus depends on memories stored in patterns,
41
and it is in the domain of memory where dementia-causing diseases
42do damage.
31 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 31; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra
note 1, at 69; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 1.
32 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 56-57.
33 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 302.
34 Id. at 23.
35 See id. at 35.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 23.
38 Meaningful communication requires the production and comprehension of ideas. The
act of speaking, in and of itself, does not constitute communication because that which is
spoken may be structurally and semantically meaningless. Nor does knowing the grammar
of a language ensure the ability to communicate. One can know the rules for combining
sounds into words, and words with each other, without being able to intentionally
communicate. Communication occurs only when sounds and words have been structured
in such a way that the idea of the speaker is derived by the listener. Id. at 35-40.
39 See id. at 23.
40 See id. at 24.
41 See id. at 28-29; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 1.
42 As such, dementia is one cause of aphasia, an "acquired impairment of language"
from stroke, trauma, or disease. See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 28.
2009]
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Our many memory systems 4 3 operate on different rules4 4 with
distinct neural architecture.45  Sensory memory holds information
from our senses long enough so that other brain systems can review
that data for further processing.46 Short-term memory refers to the
amount of information that can be held in consciousness.47 Contrary
to those who use the term to refer to any information obtained in the
past few years ("We went to that restaurant less than a year ago and I
can't even remember where it was located-where has my short-term
memory gone?"), short-term memory does not refer to information
that recently fell frQm consciousness. Once a memory is no longer in
consciousness, even if it was three minutes ago, it resides in long-
48term memory.
Working memory is active; it is what you are thinking about
now.4 9 Working memory also exhibits an active, decision-making
aspect-the so-called "central executive.
50
To interpret new information, we rely on previous experience.
Thus, working memory must activate past experience and -bring that
knowledge to consciousness. Generally, decisions must be made
about the new information the organism is receiving. Baddeley
called the decision-making component of working memory the
central executive. The central executive system focuses attention,
encodes information, retrieves infrmation from long-term stores,
plans action, and solves problems.
A different aspect of memory, semantic memory, stores concepts.
52
Within semantic memory one finds schema-"an attentional set
formed by the simultaneous activation of a group of related
concepts" 53-that we carry for a seemingly endless set of activities
(e.g., we have schema for eating at a Chinese restaurant, going
through security at an airport, putting gas in an automobile, using a
cell phone, etc.).54
43 Id. at 37.
44 Id. at.38.
45 Id. at 50.
46 Id. at 37-38.
47 Id. at 38-39.
48 Id. at 39.
49 Id. at 38.
50 Id. at 39.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 40.
53 Id. at 41.
54 Id.
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This accounts for how a person with advanced Alzheimer's can
walk straight into a piece of furniture even though the brain clearly
perceives it. Semantic memory simply did not retrieve the concept of
furniture or the related schema of how to move through a furnished55
space. I got a sense of this phenomenon last year. I ran a red light
(fortunately, no other cars were present). I looked at the light and
plainly saw it was red, but in that instant, my brain did not retrieve the
construct that seeing a red orb equals applying pressure to the brake.
Episodic memory contains events (e.g., I met my son for coffee
yesterday, I covered propensity evidence in last Thursday's class, my
56
wife and I spent our anniversary away at the ocean last month).
Lexical memory contains words,57 while nondeclarative memory
guides motor skills so one does not have to constantly learn how to
walk or tie one's shoes.58
Dementia compromises all memory systems; damage to the frontal
lobe and systems providing input to the frontal lobe is common.
Thus, the person with Alzheimer's loses working and episodic
memory first, followed by loss of semantic memory.59
B. The Effect on the Individual Resulting from Damage to the Brain
by Dementia-Causing Disease
Any discussion of the effect and impact of a dementia-causing
disease on the individual necessarily proceeds in the form of
generalization. We are talking about individuals. People with
dementia do not exhibit all the symptomology that reports of
caregivers associate with dementia, and those behaviors the individual
does manifest do not often last for the entire term of the disease. 60 In
fact, many are temporary, although often followed by new, equally
61difficult behavior. That said, there are common patterns
nonetheless.
55 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 108.
56 BAYLES & TOMEDA, supra note 1, at 42.
57 Id. at 51.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 5, 69.
60 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 66; BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 36
(explaining that the precise cognitive-communication deficits will partly be a function of
the area of the brain damaged); MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 23 (discussing that
different cognitive abilities are affected "unevenly," and consequently, the person with
dementia is able to do some things competently, but not others).
61 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 66.
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Consider the implications of the previous section for the dementia
sufferer.
The production and comprehension of language cannot be separated
from cognition. Rather, communication is a manifestation of
cognition. Persons with dementia have trouble producing linguistic
information because they have trouble thinking and generating and
ordering ideas, in part because information-processing capabilities
of declarative and working memory systems are disturbed, in part
because of degradation of knowledge. These same individuals have
difficulty comprehending language because of deficits in the
cognitive processes of perception, recogniti n, attention,
inferencing memory, and degradation of knowledge.6
For those in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease (which this
Article will focus on because it is the most common cause of
dementia), the episodic memory constantly fails-getting lost while
walking or on a drive, 63 forgetting to take medicine, forgetting what
they were talking about, repeating the same story they told an hour
ago. Lexical memory's degradation leaves a formerly articulate
person struggling to find appropriate words64 with increasing use of
imprecise "empty words" like "thing" and "it.", 65 Asking where a
family member with dementia placed a red enamel Dutch oven may
in the course of a lexical struggle emerge as "the red cooking thing."
This experience is described by dementia sufferers:
For a while, I'll search for a word and I can see it walking away
from me. It gets littler and littler. It always comes back, but at the
wrong time. You can't be spontaneous.
I really can't converse very well at all. So that's very limiting. I
can't think of things to say before somebody's already said it and
they've superseded what I have to say. The words get tangled very
easily and I get frustrated when I can't think of a word. Every time
I converse with somebody, there's always some word I can't
remember. I really cuss when I can't remember a word.
62 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 47.
63 Id. at 42; see also id. at 47 (explaining that those with dementia forget what they just
heard, read, or thought).
64 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 35; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra
note 1, at 60 (stating that in mid-stage Alzheimer's, the difficulty of finding words
becomes more obvious in spontaneous speech).
65 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 66.
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I'm aware that I'm losing larger and larger chunks of memory... I
lose one word and then I can't come up with the rest of the
sentence. I justtop talking and people think something is really
wrong with me.
Imagine how upsetting it would be to watch the progressive loss of
67your competencies, to give up your independence (e.g., beingdenied the right to drive), your responsibilities and accompanying
• i 69 yorrepnsbliis.n 70
social roles, and your positions of leadership in the family. Not
surprisingly, the demented individual starts to exhibit anger,
irritability, and confusion and becomes frightened.7'
Usually at this time of the school year, when I come home from
work, Martha has changed out of her school clothes, has a load of
laundry in the washer, dinner on the stove, and is finishing scoring
the tests of the children she worked with today. But lately the scene
is different. When I come in, she is sitting at the table in her school
clothes. There is no laundry going, nothing on the stove. Piles of
crumpled papers surround her on the table and floor on which she
has unsuccessfully tried to record and compute test scores. She has
been unable to use the charts and do the straightforward
computations that she has done for years. She is frustrated, angry,
frightened. She shouts; she cries. I help her do the calculations and
even rewrite some of the summaries she has struggled with. She
calms down somewhat but is still very upset. "What's wrong with
me?" she asks. I can't answer because I don't know but we both
know that something is very wrong, and we are afraid.12
Also not surprisingly, persons with dementia become increasingly
unsure, losing the sense that they can trust themselves in the world.
All they want is for things to be normal again, to be like how they
73
were.
Being unsure is an experience wherein people can nqjonger take
themselves for granted in how they are in the world. They are
66 Lisa Snyder, Personhood and Interpersonal Communication in Dementia, in
DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 259, 261 (citations omitted) (quoting various accounts).
67 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 30; Catherine Oppenheimer, IAm, Thou Art:
Personal Identity in Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 193, 197.
68 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 84-88; Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at
197.
69 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 197 (observing that dementia takes away the
individual's previously held social roles).
70 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 142.
71 See id. at 207.
72 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 3.
73 See id. at 12.
74 Phinney, supra note 18, at 11.
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often unsure of themselv% and are not fully at ease as they live
their day-to-day lives ....
In the middle stage of Alzheimer's, the individual changes most
dramatically, "becoming more dependent on others for survival."7 6
The person becomes disoriented as to place in addition to time,77 not
recognizing where he or she is. Increasingly, the deficits in various
memory systems make spontaneous speech more and more difficult
78
• 79
and interfere with the ability to comprehend and retain explanations.
Without a competent executive function in working memory, the
person can no longer make plans and act on them.80 For even in the
unlikely event such a plan was made, working memory would be
unable to retrieve it from long-term memory.
With a loss of orientation as to space, the familiar becomes alien.
It is no wonder dementia sufferers begin to hoard and hide food. 81
They are surrounded by strangers they do not understand. Paranoia-
82
accusing family of stealing possessions 2-makes complete sense.
You do not remember where you put or hid some possession, and do
not recall some family member's explanation an hour earlier about
where it had gone. 83 At some point in the disease, it becomes very
84hard to make a person feel safe in that person's own home.
A person's feelings also affect his behavior. The person with
dementia probably feels lost, worried, anxious, vulnerable, and
helpless much of the time. He may also be aware that he fails at
tasks and feel that he is making a fool of himself. Imagine what it
must feel like to want to say something nice to your caregiver but
all that comes out are curse words. Think how frightening it must
be if a fangiliar home and familiar people now seem strange and
unfamiliar.
75 Id.
76 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 65.
77 Id.
78 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67; Snyder, supra note 66, at 261.
79 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 38; see also id. at 25 (explaining that a
demented person will only comprehend or recall part of a conversation and then act on that
part, responding to what they think was said).
80 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 28; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 84.
81 See MACE & RABINs, supra note 18, at 68, 133.
82 Id. at 155.
83 Id. at 159-60; see also id. at 38 (describing that it becomes increasingly difficult for
the demented individual to understand explanation).
84 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 119.
85 MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 24.
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During the late stages of Alzheimer's, the individual can become
disoriented as to person (i.e., does not know who he or she is), 86 as
well as place and time. The sufferer might be unable to speak more
than one or two words87 "and may recognize no one or only one or
two people." 88  This person will be unable to walk, having lost
89 90
nondeclarative memory or to care for themselves in any way.
"There is incontinence of bladder and bowel. Intellect is devastated
by a global failure of working and declarative memory systems and
individuals are unable to carry out basic ADLs," 9' forgetting even
how to swallow or eat.92
In the end, the nervous system fails, resulting in death.93  The
cause of death is dementia.94
II
EXPOSING THE CULTURAL BLINDERS THAT IMPAIR OUR ABILITY TO
PERCEIVE THE REALITY OF PAS AND DEMENTIA-THE MYTH,
REJECTING THE MYTH, AND COMBATING SELF-FULFILLING
DYNAMICS
A. The Myth of the "Empty Shell"
It is common for people in our culture to see the severely demented
as being dead or as good as dead.95 Intelligent people have described
86 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67.
87 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 36.
88 Id. at 291; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 56 (discussing that demented
individuals may get to the "point where they do not recognize the people around them").
89 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 90-92.
90 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67 (explaining that demented individuals
"are unable to carry out basic ADLs").
91 "ADLs" refers to "activities of daily living" (dressing, bathing, grooming, and such).
See Elaine M. Brody et al., Excess Disabilities of Mentally Impaired Aged: Impact of
Individualized Treatment, 25 GERONTOLOGIST 124, 127 (1971). For further description of
early-stage dementia, see A.F. JORM, THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND
RELATED DISORDERS 26-27 (1990).
92 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 72.
93 Id. at 113.
94 Id. at 114; see also id. at 291 (explaining that the natural progression of Alzheimer's
disease usually ends in death). It is difficult, however, to determine the point at which the
Alzheimer's sufferer becomes "terminal." See id.
95 Alison Phinney, Fluctuating Awareness and the Breakdown of the Illness Narrative
in Dementia, 1 DEMENTIA 329, 338-40 (2002); see also A. Harry Lesser, Dementia and
Personal Identity, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 55, 57 (explaining caregivers say things
like "[h]e's not there any more"); Eric Matthews, Dementia and the Identity of the Person,
in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 163, 163.
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the demented as being no more than an empty shell or living a
cabbage-like existence.
Those suffering from severe dementia are easily viewed as mere
"shells" of their former selves. Philosopher John Arras has made
use of this metaphor to describe an elderly demented woman:
"Unfortunately, she appears to have been reduced to a mere shell of
her former self. She can no longer reason, communicate (except in
the most rudimentary, reflexive manner), relate to her family, or
experience the manifestations of love." Arras concludes that she
"continues to have biological life, but her biographical life has
come to an end."
Think about what these public sentiments really mean. Beaches
are littered with empty shells. Perhaps we will take note of a
particularly shiny or pretty one, but it is still just an empty shell. We
could as easily ignore it, try to skip it along the water, or step on it
and crush it. It is just an empty shell. Now think about the "life" of a
cabbage. It is a vegetable. It sits on the ground, rooted in dirt, and
rots unless we choose to pick it and dice it for coleslaw. We feel no
emotion, no feeling in connection with a cabbage. This idea that the
human "self' is lost with dementia pervades our culture.
The loss of mind in 'dementia' reflects the common and
distressing observation by relatives, carers, and doctors that 'self is
lost slowly as the illness progresses. The scientific and popular
literature has largely reflected this concept with books such as The
Loss of Self (Cohen & Eisdorfer 2001) or Alzheimer's Disease:
Coping with a Living Death (Woods 1989). Films like Iris. ...
showing the deterioration of the author and philosopher Iris
Murdoch, and media reports describing the illness of the late US
96 Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 9.
97 Post, supra note 21, at 715 (quoting John D. Arras, The Severely Demented,
Minimally Functional.Patient: An Ethical Analysis, 36 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOCY 938, 941
(1988)). Some philosophers have viewed the severely demented as mere "shells,"
individuals who possess "biological life," not "biographical life." See id.; JAMES
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: THE MORALITY OF EUTHANASIA 50 (1986) (sharing the
view that only biographical life has the quality of a true life worthy of moral
consideration).
In response to Arras and Rachels, Stephen G. Post argues:
"A mere shell" implies that there is nothing present within, but the metaphor
obscures the continued presence of the patient's affective core and the
uncertainties of determining radical cognitive devastation. Severely demented
older persons are, after all, neither brain dead nor in a persistent vegetative state.
We might wonder, and not incidentally, whether cognition is any more important
than affection in determining personhood.
Post, supra note 21, at 716.
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President Ronald Reagan, have continue98 to reinforce the idea of
the annihilation of self in people's minds.
We are a culture of youth, where the latest techno-toy is what
matters. In this world of "new-worship," the aging already tend to be
devalued.99  On top of this so-called ageism is the widely held
cultural narrative of the inevitable journey of the demented from
father, mother, friend, child, mentor, and worker to empty shell and
cabbage. There would seem to be little sense in constraining the
notion of permitting PAS for these (otherwise extremely expensive)
cabbages and shells.
This cultural belief system, moreover, does not merely rest on fear
and misconception. In the realm of the philosophy of psychiatry,'
°°
the empty shell myth finds support in a number of philosophical''
and psychological' 0 2 theories. It is the philosophy of John Locke,
98 Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 144 (footnote omitted).
99 See BYTHEWAY, supra note 30, at 14, 30-31; Bavidge, supra note 2, at 48. For an
analysis explaining why the concept that old age is a "second childhood" is both
conceptually incorrect and culturally demeaning, see Harry Cayton, From Childhood to
Childhood? Autonomy and Dependence Through the Ages of Life, in DEMENTIA, supra
note 2, at 277, 285.
100 See generally DEMENTIA, supra note 2 (presenting an anthology of recent thoughts
of major figures in the field of the philosophy of psychiatry).
101 Philosophically, Cartesians would find no problem, given the fundamental concept
of "I think, therefore I am," to conclude within their conception of mind-body dualism that
if the mind fails, the self ceases to exist. See ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MIND 17 (1989); Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 151. For the modem dualist
stance, see Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 8.
A similar conclusion is reached by Kantian philosopher Michael Luntley, albeit by a
different analysis. For Luntley, the self is that which "keep[s] track of things." See
Michael Luntley, Keeping Track, Autobiography, and the Conditions for Self-Erosion, in
DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 105, 106. For Luntley, saying "I" may be evidence of, but not
sufficient for, personal identity. Id. at 106-07. But see Steven R. Sabat & Rom Harr6, The
Construction and Deconstruction of Self in Alzheimer's Disease, 12 AGEING & SOCIETY
443, 445-47 (1998) (explaining that the "self," as represented by the lexical "I," is formal
and not dependent on memory). If the use of "I" becomes merely a habit, this will be
reflected in discourse. See id. at 443 (explaining that empirical evidence indicates that the
self "persists far into the end stage of the disease").
For Luntley, these "things" are selected and ordered according to the "point of view" of
the self or "I." See Luntley, supra, at 110.
If, in theory, one could no longer "keep track of things" (as might be the case in later
stages of dementia), the self would cease to exist. Id. at 106. But see supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
102 In the field of cognivist psychology, all meaning making takes place inside the skull
of the individual. See ALAN J. PARKIN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 3 (1996); see also Tim Thornton, The Discursive Turn, Social
Constructionism, and Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 123. Cognitivists can also
accept many postmodern concepts involving social construction of meaning. They accept
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however, that provides the most commonly relied upon intellectual
support for the empty shell myth.
For Locke, it was not sufficient that the subject had a biological
existence or even was a thinking entity (for animals also think). A
person must be capable of self-reflection' ° 4 or, at least to some
degree, self-knowledge. Locke defined a "person" as a "thinking
intelligent being [that] can consider itself as itself, the same thinking
thing, in different times and places."1
0 5
Under this definition, when, as occurs with severe dementia, one
loses memory of a self in different places in time and even loses
orientation as to person, t 6 the individual ceases to be a person.
1 7
Modem Lockeans108 rely upon Locke's notion of a person to deny
personhood to individuals in a persistent vegetative state. 
1 09
that mental states or meanings are caused by social factors. Id. at 126. Ultimately,
however, for a cognitive psychologist, the effects of such social influences are "mediated
by what happens within the skull." Id. Thus, to the extent that under this psychological
theory everything happens inside the skull (i.e., the brain), as the brain fails so does the
existence of the self whose inner world is shutting down.
103 See Matthews, supra note 95, at 165.
104 See E. Jonathan Lowe, Can the Self Disintegrate? Personal Identity,
Psychopathology, and Disunities of Consciousness, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 89, 94;
Matthews, supra note 95, at 165. For modem Lockeans, "persons" are those capable of
appreciating their own value. See generally JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1985);
John Harris, A Philosophical Case Against the Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 30, at 36, 40-41; John Harris, Euthanasia and the
Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 30, at 6 [hereinafter Harris, The
Value of Life]; John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A
Legal Analysis, in DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA 139, 174-75 (Dennis J. Horan &
David Mall eds., 1977); Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in DEATH, DYING, AND
EUTHANASIA, supra, at 293, 295; PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE
COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL ETHICS 183 (1994); Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, For
Sometimes Letting-and Helping-Die, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 149 (1986); Van
Rensselaer Potter, On Dying with Personhood, in EUTHANASIA: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
COMPANION, at 24-26 (Lisa Yount ed., 2002).
105 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 285. (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1690).
106 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67.
107 See Jennifer Radden & Joan M. Fordyce, Into the Darkness: Losing Identity with
Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 71, 71.
108 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 104, at 180, 197-98; Harris, The Value of Life, supra
note 104, at 9.
109 See SINGER, supra note 104, at 192, 206-07; Harris, The Value of Life, supra note
104, at 18.
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B. Rejecting the Myth
1. Lessons from Experience
a. A Fuller View of the Demented
Among caregivers who work with the demented, increasing
numbers report that they do not find any correspondence between the
individuals for whom they care and the crude cultural, metaphorical
characterizations used like empty shell and cabbage-like. Even when
seriously demented, a person can find sources of joy and pleasure.1 10
"A dementing illness does not suddenly end a person's capacity to
experience love or joy, nor does it end her ability to laugh." '111 Like
many persons with even severe dementia, my mother took great joy in
listening to music 112 and the weekly visits of a friendly dog that was
brought to the care facility where she lived. 113
Caregivers consistently report that they are aware of a "self' in
even severely demented individuals.' 14 In the first place, even those
with more advanced forms of dementia have relatively lucid
moments. 115  Particular circumstances or certain times of day may
allow a person with memory loss to seem more normal.'1 6 As one
family member with a father-in-law who suffered from dementia
noted:
In the few minutes after leaving the Family Alliance day program,
when I was driving home with Mike, he would make comments or
talk to me in a perfectly normal manner, just like it was you and me,
perfectly normal. It would be just for those few RUnutes and then it
was gone. I really treasured those few moments.
110 SINGER, supra note 104, at 132-34, 299, 370; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Letting
Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 887 (1992) (observing
there is value to the experiences in a demented person's life); cf Robertson, supra note
104, at 176 (explaining that an insane person is still regarded as a "specific" person).
111 MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 213.
112 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 198.
113 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 204 (explaining that positive results are
seen when demented persons are provided "something to nurture," such as pets or plants).
114 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 145.
115 Id.; cf Stephen G. Post, Respectare: Moral Respect for the Lives of the Deeply
Forgetful, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 223, 230 (noting that a demented person might
find coherence in "another time" that can be recalled).
116 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 178.
117 Id.
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Perhaps dementia is akin to an electrical short where at times you
shake the wire just right and the bulb goes on." 18 There were a few
times during visits with my mother in her Alzheimer's residence
when, for ten or fifteen minutes, we had a relatively normal
conversation, punctuated with mom's laughter at the existential
absurdity of her condition.' 1  Other times, her conversation was
gibberish. Could a coherent mom have been trapped inside, generally
unable to communicate in expressed language because of the
devastation to the systems making such forms of communication
possible? At the time I would have said that such a possibility was
highly unlikely. But I have since come across a case study that gives
me pause. In this study, the dementia patient was given antidementia
drugs. In her case, the results were spectacular. From living an
existence that many would equate with a cabbage-
noncommunicative and seemingly unaware of her environment-the
patient regained her communicative faculties.1" 0  When she did, she
was able to recall in detail what had transpired while she was
121
supposedly an empty shell. Was there something unique about her
disease? Might she have been misdiagnosed, suffering from
something else that mimicked dementia? 122  Who can know?
Nonetheless, it serves as a cautionary tale to the practice of quickly
categorizing the severely demented as all but inanimate objects.
Beyond issues of what is called rational cognition, caregivers are
adamant about feeling a "sense of humanity" in even the most
severely. demented. 12 3  Demented persons, regardless of how they
may score on tests measuring their cognitive, word, and language
118 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 39.
119 As to the demented person's awareness of the condition, see Thornton, supra note
102, at 130. See also Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 151 ("It is certainly the case
that people with dementia can be aware of the loss of their capacities and of aspects of
their inner selves."). Iris Murdoch spoke of herself as "sailing into the darkness." JOHN
BAYLEY, IRIS: A MEMOIR OF IRIS MURDOCH 179 (1998). But see Phinney, supra note 95,
at 330 (explaining that a demented person's awareness of their symptoms fluctuates-
sometimes they are aware that they are forgetful, other times not).
120 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 150.
121 Id.
122 Illness or depression can exacerbate the symptoms of dementia. See MACE &
RABINS, supra note 18, at 293, 310. In fact, even without dementia, depression alone can
affect memory. Id. at 6. Additionally, some treatable conditions, such as delirium or
thyroid problems, can seem like or even cause temporary dementia. See id. at 9-10, 14.
123 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 145.
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skills, have "an emotional and relational reality,"'124 retaining the
ability to make compassionate connections. 125
The reality is that until the very advanced and even terminal stage
of dementia, the person with dementia will usually have
sporadically articulated memories of deeply meaningful events and
relationships ensconced in long-term memory .... Even in the
advanced stage of dementia . . . one finds varying degrees of
emotional and relational expression, remnants of personality, and
even meaningful non-verbal communication (as in the reaching out
for a hug).12,
In fact, those with dementia retain many of their capacities until the
very final stages of the disease. In early-stage Alzheimer's, the
individual generally has good recognition memory, can follow a
three-stage command, can sustain attention and selectively attend to
stimuli, has semantic knowledge intact, can read and comprehend at
the sentence level, and can independently perform basic ADLs (using
the toilet, bathing, feeding, etc.). 127 In middle-stage Alzheimer's, the
person can follow a two-step command; can sustain attention for
limited amounts of time in a low distraction environment; has fair
recognition memory; has good grammar, syntax, and social language;
can reminisce about tangible stimuli; can comprehend simple
statements, yes or no questions, and most choice questions; and
•. 128
generally is able to perform basic ADLs with minimal assistance.
Even at late-stage Alzheimer's, where dementia is severe, the person
can generally recognize his or her own name; often can contribute to a
conversation; may attend to positive stimuli for short periods; retains
some aspects of social language (greetings, leave taking, responding
to a compliment); may answer simple yes or no and choice questions;
and may feed himself or herself with minimal assistance. 129
124 See Post, supra note 115, at 232.
125 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 175.
126 Id. at 231; see also Guy A.M. Widdershoven & Ron L.P. Berghmans, Meaning-
Making in Dementia: A Hermeneutic Perspective, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 179, 179
(stating that until very late in the progression of the disease, the demented person can
manipulate objects, react to others, and make meaning through expressed moods).
127 See supra note 90.
128 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 223; see also Joseph M. Foley, The
Experience of Being Demented, in DEMENTIA AND AGING: ETHICS, VALUES, AND POLICY
CHOICES 30-43 (Robert H. Binstock et al. eds., 1992).
129 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 223; see also Barry Reisberg et al., The Final
Stage of Alzheimer's Disease: Issues for the Patient, Family, and Professional
Community, in ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND RELATED DISORDERS: PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES
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While these quotes and citations about the full humanity of the
dementia sufferer counter the empty shell myth, they do so in an
analysis removed from the three-dimensional reality of life with
dementia. They lack texture and color; they do not put us face to face
with a real human being. Yet it is the lives of real humans that the
insidious myth of the empty shell directly impacts. Therefore, I tell a
portion of my mother's story to remedy this deficiency in my attack
on the myth. 130
One caution: The human experience unfolds in the prose of
narrative; the academic do so in the language of analysis and
authority. So the reader must now be prepared for a shift from the
academic into the narrative, and then back again into the academic.
The Story Begins: Mom Loses It
Mom's confusion about when or where things happened and who
was there when they did, as well as her increasing tendency to
suddenly use total nonsense words ("I think it's under the flebus. "),
must have been very frustrating and frightening for her, although
publicly she dealt with her mental slips by laughing at herself. But it
was no laughing matter.
I can only imagine what it would be like for some person I did not
know who was undergoing the experience of watching her mind
breaking down, day by day. Mom, however, I knew. She was
extremely bright, extremely capable. A straight "A " student who had
secret dreams of medical school, but instead became a housewife.
The path of her life was in part the result of her times and the narrow
range of expectations foisted on women in America in the 1940s. But
it was more complex than that. I was around seventeen-years-old
when I inadvertently came across a box of clippings while cleaning a
closet. To my utter amazement, my demanding, seemingly humdrum
suburban mom, with whom I constantly butted heads over the exalted
trivialities of teen existence, had been a ballerina when she met dad.
And she'd been a great ballerina-rave reviews from the Paris Opera
where she had been the youngest American to ever dance solo, and
FOR THE PATIENT, FAMILY, .STAFF, AND COMMUNITY 5, 12-16 (Richard Mayeux et al.
eds., 1998).
130 1 also tell her story because, for reasons analogous to the methodology of the
emerging feminist movement, it is important that such stories-those of dementia-be
told. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1634 (1991) (discussing the centrality of
storytelling in the feminist movement).
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equal plaudits from her performance at the Hollywood Bowl. And the
pictures. Mom looked like a 1930's movie star. Amazing.
Then, in her sixties, Mom suffered a serious heart attack. She
recovered but she no longer had her ability to accurately calculate
rows of figures in her head. This was the first of a progression of
increasingly serious cognitive blows.
Within a year or so, Mom was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease.
Her increasing confusion, thus, was always attributed to some aspect
of her disease or her treatment. Her Sinimet was not the right
dosage, her Parkinson's and high blood pressure meds were
intersecting, she ate too soon after taking the meds, she ate too late
after taking the meds, she ate protein in the morning (Dad's private
theory), and on and on. Anything, but anything, was used other than
the possibility that Mom was losing her mind. And it was happening
for a far, far longer period of time than I realized. My sister Kathy
knew long before me after a Florida visit in which Mom hadn't really
recognized her the first day. It was Mom's meds, the story went.
Always her meds. But Kathy was skeptical. Dad was covering for
her, but it was not so obvious. The problem was that Dad always had
the annoying habit of speaking for Mom in regular conversation, even
when Mom was just fine. Mom, of course, would give him "the look. "
That was their shtick. So, it was easy for Dad to cover in our weekly
phone conversations. Mom would be on the phone, but dad would
say, "Your Mom did this or that-didn 't you dear." This was
annoying, but not unusual, particularly since Mom did not talk much
anyway, even in person.
The news in 1995 that Dad possibly had fourth-stage pancreatic
cancer pushed her over the edge. He was her constant companion of
fifty-two years, her caretaker, and her organizer. He loved Mom,
rarely leaving her side. He cooked, cleaned, dressed Mom, shopped,
paid bills, dealt with investments, organized their social life, dealt
with her medications, led her through her daily physical exercise, and
made her do memory problems to keep her mind going. Mom fully
understood what the diagnosis of pancreatic cancer meant. She was
not stupid, even as she became more confused. She saw things for
what they were: she was very sick, and her life companion was dying.
Even after we all knew dad was dying, Mom would still
communicate, and, at times, was clever and intelligent; however, she
was terrified, distracted, and confused to an extent far beyond how
she had been afew weeks before. I have in my memory what was, for
me, an unforgettable image of Mom losing it. Shortly after my folks'
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arrival in Tacoma, Washington, where my wonderful wife Eva and I
had brought Mom and Dad to live after .the initial diagnosis of
cancer, we went out to dinner with my wife's huge family, the whole
Beatty cln. Mom sat next to Eva's mom, Bea. Mom loved Bea, and
Bea loved Mom. Even today, Bea sometimes wears Mom's red winter
coat 'Just because it makes me feel like she's close by. " Mom also
loved food, had loved eating for as long as I remember. Perhaps this
was a lifelong reaction to food deprivation during her dancing days.
But at this dinner, Mom went beyond any norm. For, all of a sudden,
there was Mom eating the food off of Bea's plate with her hands,
totally oblivious to all but the primal desire for food. Even so, we all
attributed this incident to shock-the terrible news, suddenly being
snatched from her home, and such. It would be quite awhile before
we faced the truth.: Mom had dementia.
Fast Forward a Year: The Alzheimer's Residence
Over the course of the next year, we moved Mom in and out of
three assisted-living facilities. 131 While each had its own story, the
bottom line was the same: none was equipped to deal with a resident
who was both very mobile and very demented. Finally on the fourth
try, we got it right.
The best thing we ever did for Mom was to move her into a nearby
residence specifically built, organized, and staffed to serve the needs
of residents who had dementia. Mom had her own room along a
short corridor of similar rooms. Three similar corridors joined my
mother's corridor, spokes funneling into a huge central circle. The
circle in turn contained an open dining area, kitchen, and a beautiful
common area with comfortable chairs and couches, a television, a
cassette player for music, and a huge stone fireplace. Mom thought
she lived in a "lovely lodge, "and I guess she did.
Unlike any of the previous residences, this was a noninstitutional
institution. Breakfast, lunch, and dinner were served at regular
hours, but, ifyou didn't want to get up, that was fine. You could have
breakfast at 2:00 p.m. You could have snacks whenever you wanted,
and they'd keep stashes of the "private treats" that we bought for
Mom and dole them out when she requested.
Most significantly, the entire staff was a well-trained, well-
educated, relatively mature group who truly understood dementia.
Concerned and compassionate, they just laughed when Mom, who
131 It is common for those with dementia to go through several placements. See
MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 120-21.
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was generally very sweet and funny and genuinely loved by the staff
would open her mouth, and out would come, "Get over here, fat ass. "
They were knowledgeable; they understood. Mom was demented.
They weren 't about to take moments like that seriously.
Mom was very happy. The staff played with her, fed her, teased
her, hugged and comforted her, kept her clean, and did her hair-a
lovely, lovely lodge (expensive, but no more so than the previous
three residences).
And Mom had friends, though their conversations would resemble
two televisions on different channels facing each other. The women
"shopped" together. They would get dressed up, grab their purses,
and catch the bus to the stores. (I learned this from asking a group of
women who were standing together in the residence how they were
doing. "Fine. " One said, "But we have to go now, our bus is here. "
The rest of the women nodded.) Then they'd go down the corridors
and peek in unlocked rooms (once, one such shopper, while pointing
to a particular room, told Eva, "I wouldn't waste your time there,
nothing really to buy-and what there is, is too expensive. ').
Also, Mom loved animals, and Mom loved music. Once a week, to
Mom s delight, they'd bring a dog by, and once a week musical
performers would entertain the demented audience. It was quite
wonderful.
When I'd visit, women would come up to me and start talking,
thinking I was their son or some other relation. The men (sadly, some
younger than me) would take me aside to let me know that I could
count on them completely if I "ever needed insurance" or "needed
help even with my investment portfolio." They continued the lives
they had known.
Mom wouldn't always recognize me when I came in (whether the
result of the dementia or the fact she somehow lost her glasses when
she moved in, I cannot say)., But when she heard my voice, even from
a considerable distance, she'd stand up, look around, and say, "I
hear Johnny's voice. "
A few times, we had conversations that were both coherent and
fairly in touch with reality. Other times, she'd be confused and would
laugh and laugh at how out of it she was. It was strange, like her
coherent self was taking a bemused look at her demented self. We
took her out for ice cream a few times, and it was fun for her. But it
was also extremely difficult to get in and out of the car, and she often
got disoriented and upset when we returned.
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She'd laugh when I'd read through the postcards and letters my
sister, Kathy, regularly sent her- "That little devil, Kathy, she's a
pistol, isn't she?" Often, she was totally coherent; it's just that she
was what could be fairly characterized as a psychological time
traveler. One day, she was with Dad in the war, another, going out
for an evening at a club with a group of young friends in the 1950s;
or she would relate a discussion she 'just" had with a 1960s
neighbor.
I also saw my Mom in love. One time, Eva and I came into the
main room. Mom was sitting by herself in a big soft chair, a
mischievous grin on her face. "I've got a secret. " Her entire voice
and affect was of a young woman. Finally, we worked through the
coyness and giggles and found out that she had just gotten engaged to
my father. It was 1941, and she was a twenty-four-year-old girl in
love. Amazing, to see my own mother in love.
Mom Reaches the End
In her second year at the Alzheimer's residence, Mom developed
ulcers on several parts of her body. As much as the specialist and the
residence staff tried, and they tried very hard, they could not get the
ulcers under control. Mom had trouble walking and she had trouble
getting comfortable when lying down. She lived in constant pain,
moaning and whimpering. It was really heartbreaking.
She also stopped eating. The staff tried to feed her the best they
could, but, within a relatively short time, Mom lost between forty and
fifty pounds, back to her weight when she was an eighteen-year-old
dancer. That's part of the final course of Alzheimer's. People, even
people who loved food as much as Mom, stop eating. Maybe they
lose interest, maybe they forget how, or maybe a little of both.
As Mom's pain continued, essentially unabated, we decided to have
her taken to the hospital for treatment. The residence arranged for
an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived and Mom was wheeled
out, she was in a happy mood, waving goodbye to everyone. When I
met the ambulance twenty minutes later and they wheeled Mom out,
she was completely unresponsive. She was the same when they set
her up in a room. She never regained consciousness, dying within the
week.
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b. Non-Lockean Philosophy and Noncognitive Psychology Buttress
the View that Most Persons with Dementia Are Fully Persons Who
Retain a Personal Identity
Locke's view of what constitutes a "person" has long been attacked
on its own terms. For Locke, self-awareness is the essence of being a
person, but as other scholars have pointed out, even the most extreme
narcissist does not think of himself or herself all of the time.132
Logically, for there to be a self upon which to reflect, there must
already have been a self in existence prior to that reflection. 13 3 As a
result, the "self' cannot solely be a product of that reflection. Also,
there is nothing to explain why one would collect the particular
bundle of ideas that constitute self-awareness to store in one's brain in
the first place. What would give these ideas preferential meaning?
What accounts for the creation, existence, and perpetuation of the
perceiver' s "point of view" in the Lockean theory of personhood? 
134
Most convincingly among the traditional attacks on Locke is that
we consider infants to be persons, 135 and they possess none of the
self-reflection or memory capacities Locke ascribes as definitionally
necessary to be considered a person. One could answer that we
consider the infant to be a person, not based on its current state, but
rather our understanding that it is on a developmental path that
inevitably will 'lead it to having the capacities to be a Lockean
"person." In other words, if it forever stayed in its infant form-if it
were a sub-species called "infants"-it would not be a person. But I
would disagree. I have a grandchild who is eighteen months old at
the time I am writing this. I do not think he has a self-reflected sense
of self, and in all likelihood, he will have no memory of this stage of
his life. Still, he is my favorite person in the world to spend time
with-the funniest, most entertaining, most purely loving person I
have ever known.
132 Matthews, supra note 95, at 171.
133 Id. at 170-71. In fact, under the classic metaphysical view, a person is not
manifested by a self-reflecting consciousness, but rather by a soul that persists over time.
See, e.g., JOHN H. LEITH, BASIC CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 112 (1993) ("Karl Barth defined
the soul as the person or the self in all of its powers and reasoning, of willing, of self-
transcendence.... The soul is the self that contemplates the self and organizes all the
energies and vitalities of life for freely chosen goals." (footnote omitted)).
134 For a discussion concerning why modem Lockeans lack a satisfactory explanation
for "point of view," see Luntley, supra note 101, at 109-12.
135 See Matthews, supra note 95, at 171.
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But the significance of non-Lockean philosophers for our purposes
is not their philosophical attacks on Locke's premises. Rather, their
significance emerges in their rejection of the idea that the person is
solely the function of the internal, that the subjective is housed solely
within. Though the philosophical positions vary, and even at times
come into disagreement, all these philosophers posit a notion of self
that, at least in part, is a function of the external. tor them, mind is
formed in relationship with others and "the world." This
philosophical move, which might be termed "externalism," has
serious implications for how we view the personhood and personal
identity of dementia sufferers.
Externalism ... is a thesis about the relation between the mind and
the world: it says that the world enters constitutively into the
individuation of states of mind; mind and world are not, according
to externalism, metaphysically independent categories, sliding
smoothly past each other. 36
The point of "externalism" as a philosophical perspective in all its
variations is that our personhood and identity is in great part public
and can be publicly maintained even with diminished capacities. This
is best illustrated by the broadly held notion that personal identity is a
creation of narrative, the story of who we are.137 This creation is an
active process entailing the "on-going integration of possible
perspectives and versions of who an individual is into a coherent and
meaningful life story." 138  It is a mixture of fact and fiction,
journalism and movie making, in part a process of identifying with
the values, norms, and such of a particular community. 139 But these
stories are in no sense solely the work of the individual. These
identities are constituted "by a complex interaction between first-,• ,,t40
second-, and third-person perspectives. Other people and society
will place constraints and limitations on the stories the self-narrator
can tell. 14
1
136 COLIN McGINN, MENTAL CONTENT 9 (1989); see also Hughes et al., supra note 15,
at 16.
137 See Grant Gillett, Cognition: Brain Pain: Psychotic Cognition, Hallucinations, and
Delusions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY: A COMPANION 21, 29-30 (Jennifer
Radden ed., 2004).
138 Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 74.
139 Id.
140 Id. See generally HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON, DAMAGED IDENTITIES, NARRATIVE
REPAIR (2001).
141 See Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 74-75.
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The shape of our lives [i.e., a beginning, middle, and ending that
makes some sort of sense] is, at least in part, a function of our
imagination and choices. But we do not act in a vacuum. There are
biological structures within which we think and act and there are
sociall ructures which determine the options we take ourselves to
have.
Even when we lose the cognitive capacity to recall, tell, or add to our
own story, it can still exist through third parties. 14 3 Thus, others can
support a person's identity even when that person no longer can
create their own narrative. 14 These are not stories told at one's
funeral or afterwards. These are stories of the individual who is
physically embodied in his or her own existence. As such, it affects
how we perceive the demented individual before us. Plainly, the
individual's narrative is weakened, but this is something we must
accept when confronting dementia.1 45 While no longer the author in
a full sense, the demented person is nonetheless the subject of the146
story.
Identity through the "webs of interlocution" 47 within which we
live is a variant on narrative. I am John Mitchell, son of Lenore and
Jim; brother to Kathy; husband to Eva; father to David and Sarah;
friend to Mehmet; colleague to Anne, Marilyn, and Annette; teacher
of evidence; student of John Kaplan; graduate from Stanford Law
School in 1970; and so on. An analogous conception was expressed
as follows:
My self-definition is understood as an answer to the question Who I
am. And this question finds its original sense in the interchange of
speakers. I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the
family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and
functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and also
142 Bavidge, supra note 2, at 42.
143 See F. Brian Allen & Peter G. Coleman, Spiritual Perspectives on the Person with
Dementia: Identity and Personhood, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 205, 216; John
McMillan, Identity, Self and Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 63, 69;
Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 200 (explaining that family members hold pieces of the
demented person's identity through history, mannerisms, etc.).
144 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 152; Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107,
at 83.
145 See Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 84.
146 See id. In contrast to the third-person storyteller, as a result of the fluctuating
awareness of their symptoms, the "story" of her disease is a "narrative of chaos." See
Phinney, supra note 95, at 340-41.
147 See McMillan, supra note 143, at 66-67.
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crucially in the space of moral and spiritual orientatio within
which my most important defining relations are lived out.
Such a view of personal identity, as an interconnected web of
exterior relationships, plainly exists outside the inner world of the
individual (although exact knowledge of precisely what these
relationships "mean" to the individual may be difficult to access in
the case of the demented person). The identity persists regardless of
cognitive failure. 
149
However, could one use these same theories of social construction
and intersubjectivity, which have been posited to maintain the
personal identity of the demented person, to conclude that a particular
individual lacks such a personal identity? If we are talking only about
empirical observations of discrete individuals, the answer may well be
yes. My family and I interacted with my mother and shared her
stories, and thus were part of her webs of interlocution. But imagine
a severely demented person who has no one. They stare into space in
a state geriatric ward. No one interacts with them, is aware of them,
and carries their story. Under our intersubjective, narrative, and
social construction and webs of interlocution theories, has this
individual not lost personal identity? I do not believe so because I do
not believe that when applied to the demented, these theories are
merely empirical descriptions of particular factual instances. Rather,
these theories are imbued with normativity.
A solitary, demented individual is a human being. To allow his or
her limited capacity to preserve a semblance of a personal identity to
be extinguished for lack of any social support is factually
understandable but unpardonable. However constricted, he or she can
continue to exist as an individual if a caregiver pays attention-a
touch, a look, a fragile web enveloping a person outside of the
148 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 35 (1989).
149 There is a final theory of identity sameness, which, unlike the others previously
discussed, does not concern the nature of making meaning. It focuses on the nature of
being human. Under this view, humans are inherently "bounded beings." See Lesser,
supra note 95, at 59. We are born, grow, decline, and die. We always are changing from
our past and into our future. See id. An essential feature of our identity is that we will
decline. As part of that we may have vascular problems or we may get lucky and never
experience any coronary difficulties. We may develop dementia or we could be lucky and
die with our minds relatively intact. The point is that in our inevitable decline, one of the
possibilities we could suffer is dementia. This range of possible ways to decline has
always been essentially defining who we were as human beings-beings whose decline
could take one of a widely ranging set of paths. Dementia is just one such path; the person
is still the same (bounded by the inevitability of some narrative of decline).
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individual who looks and thinks: "This is the person who likes apple
sauce, the person who pissed on the floor and tried to clean it with her
dress, the person who had the hiccups when the handbell choir came
over to perform." As a decent society, we owe demented individuals
at least that level of care under any circumstances, particularly if their
circumstances are the reflection of the "self-fulfilling dynamics"
carefully explored in the next section of this Article.
Professor Martha C. Nussbaum takes an analogous tack in her
profound book, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species
Membership.' Nussbaum suggests an approach to establishing a
just society that meets what she perceives to be deficiencies in John
Rawls's contractarian approach I1 1 when dealing with the place of the
mentally disabled. 152 She does not discuss dementia, but her ideas
are quite applicable to this area. In place of Rawls's procedural
approach to establishing such a society, Nussbaum focuses on a
societal obligation to support a minimum level of development of a
set of "capabilities" she believes necessary to live a life of human
dignity. 153 These capabilities include life, bodily health, affiliation,
and control over one's environment. 154 In the case of the mentally or
physically disabled, these requirements for a life of human dignity,
and thus a just society in Nussbaum's view, place broad obligations
on the body politic to ensure the individual develops all their
capabilities:
[T]he Rawlsian emphasis on income and wealth suggests that the
relevant resources are items that we can distribute to individuals.
Sen's critique does not explicitly dispute this. Give the person in
the wheelchair enough money, he seems to say, and he will be able
to move from here to there; the only problem is to determine the
amount of money. This reply is insufficient. No matter how much
money we give the person in the wheelchair, he will still not have
adequate access to public space unless public space itself is
redesigned. Maybe a very rich person could afford a full-time
chauffeur and a set of bearers who could carry him up the stairs of
rampless buildings. But even if making people with impairments
that rich were a sensible goal of public policy, as it is not, we would
still have not gotten to the root of the matter, which is that this
150 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).
151 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing a
contractarian approach to justice).
152 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 150, at 98-99.
153 See id. at 70.
154 Id. at 76-78.
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person should not have to rely on a chauffeur or on bearers. There
should be wheelchair access on buses and sidewalks, and all
buildings 155should have ramps and wheelchair-accessible
elevators.
Perhaps, analogous to Nussbaum's example of the person in the
wheelchair, our society likewise should provide resources for
meaningful caregiving for the demented. Governmental obligations
aside, as fellow human beings we cannot ethically allow the identity
of a demented person, stagnating in some state institution, to dissolve
for lack of minimal efforts at human interaction. Along with the
theories nestled under the umbrella of "externalism" comes a
corresponding obligation to be agents of intersubjectivity to our
fellow humans suffering from dementia.
C. The Need to Combat Self-Fulfilling Dynamics
Debunking the myth of the empty shell is not sufficient because
real-life self-fulfilling dynamics--"positioning and labeling" and
"malignant psychology"-force dementia sufferers into the role of the
empty shell.
Interactive labels affect both the labeler and the one labeled.' 56
When a person is labeled as demented, others "position" themselves
in such a way that the demented person is seen as lesser,
marginalized.' 57 We all take positions as to others and to ourselves
relative to that other.1 58 The "[p]ositions help to define, strengthen,
or weaken [the other] person's moral and personal attributes and help
to create story-lines about [the person].' 59
While most of us can counter false, negative positioning--e.g., I
trip, and you position me as "clumsy"; I retort that there was a huge
crack in the sidewalk, pointing it out for all to see-because of their
155 Id. at 167.
A decent society will organize public space, public education, and other relevant
areas of public policy to support such lives [i.e., the lives of the mentally and
physically disabled] and fully include them, giving the caregivers all the
capabilities on our list, and the disabled as many of them, and as fully, as is
possible.
Id. at 222.
156 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 3.
157 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 271.
158 See Steven R. Sabat, Mind, Meaning, and Personhood in Dementia: The Effects of
Positioning, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 287, 289.
159 Id.
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language deficits, a person with dementia cannot easily counteract
false positioning." 6  The label of "patient"' 161 will all but assure that
the demented individual will be equated with the disease, and that all
behavior will be attributed to the disease, 162 and not with the
institutional treatment or caregiver assumptions about the demented
person's capacities.
Thus, if dementia is detached from the social and interactive and
seen only within the lens of neuropathology, the person suffering
from dementia will be perceived as solely comprised of disease and
deficits.163 All the "troublesome" language and behavior will be
perceived as symptoms of the disease, irrational and meaningless as
to content, and therefore, appropriately ignored socially and instead
treated medically. 164
In fact, even very experienced, compassionate Alzheimer's
caregivers often tend to see the person's troublesome behavior as part
of the disease and not as part of the person. 16 5 There is no doubt in
my mind from watching my mother's decline that there was
something good about her experienced caregivers' ability to just
laugh when the always dignified mother of my childhood would
mouth, "Get over here fat ass." But there is an equally troubling, if
not harmful, aspect to this approach if it is the invariable prism
A position in a conversation, then, is a metaphorical concept through
reference to which a person's 'moral' and personal attributes as a speaker are
compendiously collected. One can position oneself or be positioned as e.g.,
powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant or submissive,
definitive or tentative, authorized or unauthorized, and so on. A 'position' can be
specified by reference to how a speaker's contributions are hearable with respect
to these and other polarities of character, and sometimes even of role. Positioned
as dependent, one's cry of pain is hearable as a plea for help. But positioned as
dominant, a similar cry can be heard as a protest or even as a reprimand. It can
easily be seen that the social force of an action and the position of the actor and
interactors mutually determine one another.
L. van Lagenhove & R. Harr6, Introducing Positioning Theory, in POSITIONING THEORY:
MORAL CONTEXTS OF INTENTIONAL ACTION, 14, 17 (Ron Harr6 & Luk van Langenhove
eds., 1999).
160 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 289. See generally van Lagenhove & Harr6 supra note
159, at 20.
161 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 297; Snyder, supra note 66, at 271.
162 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 287, 289.
163 Murna Downs et al., Understandings of Dementia: Explanatory Models and Their
Implications for the Person with Dementia and Therapeutic Effort, in DEMENTIA, supra
note 2, at 235, 239-44 (discussing the "medical model" approach to dementia).
164 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 24 0.
165 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 202.
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through which the demented are viewed. This dark perspective has
been labeled "malignant social psychology."'
166
What is characterized as "challenging" or "troublesome" behavior,
far from being no more than meaningless external manifestations of
the disease, is often an attempt to communicate needs and feelings. 1
67
As such the "paranoid symptomology" that the individual is accusing
caregivers of stealing belongings may be more than a consequence of
serious memory loss. Rather, the person may be communicating the
image of one from whom everything is being taken away, and who is
therefore unreasonably wary about the fate of remaining
possessions. 168 This view may or may not be a bit far-fetched. But
there is nothing far-fetched in thinking that people's challenging
behavior at mealtimes may be an attempt to communicate some
genuine feeling about the food, where they are seated and with whom,
their level of hunger, the time of meals in the facility, etc.
Herein lies the malignancy. Demented persons experience the
breakdown of communication with others, increasingly feeling "shut
out."' 16 9 Nevertheless, they communicate on many levels besides
regular language. 17  If attempts at communication lead to negative
experiences (shame, anger, being ignored) because the caregiver
perceived these attempts to be just meaningless symptoms of the
disease, demented persons may further withdraw and cease
attempting to communicate. 17 1 The vicious cycle of decline follows
with the person increasingly losing the capacity to make meaning.
172
If one treats the person as if he or she makes no sense, he or she will
not communicate. If one does the opposite, one may begin to
understand. 1
73
166 See TOM KITWOOD, DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED: THE PERSON COMES FIRST 46-47
(1997).
167 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 245.
168 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 265.
169 Id. at 259, 261.
170 See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 143, at 67-68; Snyder, supra note 66, at 260
(demented persons communicate through body gestures, voice tones, facial expression,
and mime); Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 179.
171 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 261.
172 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 179, 187.
173 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 261; see also Guy A.M. Widdershoven & Ron L.P.
Berghmans, Advance Directives in Dementia Care: From Instructions to Instruments, 44
PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 179, 184 (2001) (stating that demented persons can
communicate, but communication takes more time and patience than most are willing to
give).
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In her first residence, my mother confronted malignant positioning
firsthand. We received a call from the residence. "Your Mom threw
a lamp at the nursing desk. Come down!" Sure enough, there was the
smashed lamp at the base of the central nursing station.
Mom was in her room, looking a bit sheepish. "Mom, did you
throw a lamp?" Smile, nod. "Mom, did you do that deliberately?"
Smile, nod. "Mom, why did you deliberately throw a lamp at the
nursing desk?" Mom was having greater and greater difficulty
expressing herself. The word she was groping for would almost be
there and then float away from her, and she would grasp for the
closest categorical approximation that she would associate in her
mind for the real word she was looking for. Thus, her attempt to say
"the attendant" may come out as "the work thing." Much decoding
was necessary. But, slowly, we got the story. An attendant came to
shower Mom several times a week. Mom's skin was very sensitive,
and the spray of water from the shower was uncomfortable for her.
This particular 180-pound attendant, however, could not have cared
less what this babbling old woman was saying. She would grab
Mom, force her into the shower, and roughly scrub her hair, really
hurting and frightening Mom. Think about it from Mom's side. A
huge thug had a key to just walk into her home at will and beat her
up. Mom was alone, defenseless. Her home, rather than providing a
sense of security, made her vulnerable and available to this demon.
What could Mom do? She went to complain at the nursing desk. She
stood there, and they ignored her. So she picked up the lamp on the
counter and threw it. "Then they paid attention to me." Smile.
Even at this supposedly posh residence, the elderly were being
abused. They were just as vulnerable, and the low-skill, low-pay,
minimally educated attendants differed little from those in any other
facility dealing with the elderly. Her attempt to report that abuse,
however, was interpreted solely through the lens of neuropathology.
Due to malignant positioning, it was unimaginable to the staff that
this crazy lamp-hurling woman may have come to the nursing desk
with a legitimate complaint.
Consistent with the concept of "malignant social psychology,"
studies show that demented patient's neurological functioning is
damaged by impoverished environments 74 and enhanced by rich
174 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 245.
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ones, including dementia support groups. 176 Similar inferences are
derived from studies of "excess disability" in dementia sufferers.
177
Excess disability refers to persons who showed far more impairment
than one would expect from the actual damage to the brain found
during an autopsy. 178  Social environment seems a likely suspect to
account for the disparity.
Old age psychiatrists daily see patients who experience some threat
to their autonomy, and a minority of our patients, at some point in
their lives, can scarcely be said to make autonomous decisions at
all. Yet we see that these patients, for all their impaired autonomy,
play an immensely significant part in the lives of the people who are
connected to them. They are participants in relationships that can
be joyful and rewarding; or troublesome, full of pain and guilt;
relationships deeply rooted in the past, or fresh encounters between
a new carer and the person needing care. It is the emotional context
of these relationships (or their absence) that determine how much
the person flourishes or withers, how much his potential for
affection, enjoyment, humour, 1md the vivid communication offeeling, are stifled or expressed.
Having shattered the myth of the empty shell, we can now look
squarely at the numerous impediments to constructing a regulatory
regime for PAS and dementia. As the following will demonstrate,
those impediments will prove insurmountable.
III
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCEPTABLE LEGAL REGIME
TO REGULATE PAS AND DEMENTIA
A. The Paradox of Dementia and Consent to Physician-Assisted
Suicide
When considering PAS and, for example, terminal cancer, the issue
of ensuring that the decision to end one's life was the result of a true
175 For a discussion of techniques for improving communication, see BAYLES &
TOMOEDA, supra note i, at 195-202. But see Stephen G. Post, Alzheimer Disease and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 7 ALZHEIMER DISEASE & ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 65, 67
(1993) (expressing concern that if the law permits PAS for dementia, then society will
cease trying to develop ways to improve treatment of demented persons).
176 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 262-64.
177 See id. at 125, 131; Brody et al., supra note 91, at 125, 131.
178 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 293.
179 Catherine Oppenheimer, Ethics in Old Age Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 317,
321 (Sidney Bloch et al. eds., 3d. ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Hughes et al.,
supra note 15, at 25.
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autonomous choice is not unproblematic. Concerns about possible
coercion by family 18  or coercion embedded within the patient-
physician interchange181 are prevalent. Even more so is the question
of the chooser's mental competency, 182 as suicidal ideation in general
180 See Leon R. Kass, "I Will Give No Deadly Drug": Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in
THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 8, at 17, 19.
This is a recurrent and real concern, which appears anywhere there is a
discussion of assisted suicide. Very sick people are extremely vulnerable. They
are exhausted from fighting the disease and pain and often depressed by what is
happening to them. In this state, they are often ambivalent about suicide,
changing their minds back and forth in relatively short periods of time. America
has such a strong culture of independence and self-reliance that dependence
becomes a source of shame. And very sick people are extremely dependent; yet,
ironically, this culture of self-reliance leads them to distance themselves from
others at the very time they most need others. I know it bothered my father,
though he never said so. They are also extremely sensitive about being a
financial and emotional burden on their loved ones. Under these circumstances,
they are susceptible to pressure from those close to them conveying the message
that it is time for them to die, especially since they might already feel they have a
"duty" to die.
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 54-55 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 54-55, nn.26-34.
181 See J.P. Bishop, Framing Euthanasia, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 225, 227 (2006) (using
experience with Do Not Resuscitate orders to demonstrate how doctors can completely
influence their patients' choices by the specific word choices the physicians use in
presenting options); see also RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, EUTHANASIA IN THE
NETHERLANDS: THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF MERCY KILLING 97-98 (2004) (observing
that by presenting the topic of euthanasia as a just "medical" option, doctors can influence
their patients' decisions); Callahan & White, supra note 3, at 28 (addressing the difficulty
of assessing the adequacy of a particular patient's consent for PAS because the patient will
be dead).
182 See Malcolm Parker, End Games: Euthanasia Under Interminable Scrutiny, 19
BIOETHICS 523, 526 (2005) (Australian researchers claim a new psychiatric diagnosis,
Demoralization Syndrome (DS), rules out the possibility of a rational suicide, finding the
"desire to die being symptomatic of the detectable pathological condition."); Mark D.
Sullivan et al., Should Psychiatrists Serve as Gatekeepers for Physician-Assisted Suicide?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1998, at 24, 25 (explaining that the modem medical
model concluded that suicide is never the choice of a rational agent, but rather a symptom
of mental illness); see also David M. Clarke & David W. Kissane, Demoralization: Its
Phenomenology and Importance, 36 AUST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 733 (2002); Lillie &
Werth, Jr., supra note 14, at 2 ("Let me be clear here: I do not agree with the concept of
rational suicide, especially as applied to people with disabilities, primarily because of
social and cultural concerns ...."). But see HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 11, at 76
(explaining that suicide can be a totally rational response to a particular situation); James
G. Adams, Life or Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Emergency Medicine, 3 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 909, 909 (1996) (finding sixty-one percent of primary care physicians
believe that suicide can be rational);. Kyriaki Mystakidou et al., The Evolution of
Euthanasia and Its Perceptions in Greek Culture and Civilization, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. 95, 96 (2005) ("Though suicide is generally viewed to be a pathological state of
mind, most often linked to depression, some professionals hypothesize that suicide in
some circumstances can be quite rational."); Parker, supra, at 527 (seeing the fact that
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is strongly correlated with mental illness, i s3 and not surprisingly,
those with terminal illnesses seeking PAS are often depressed. 84
Allowing PAS for dementia surely raises all these concerns. It also
raises what I term a "Catch-22" problem.' Autonomous decision
making presupposes that two conditions exist for choosers: (1) they
have full information 186 and (2) they are competent.' i 7  It is not
difficult to imagine someone With cancer who has been diagnosed
with having six months to live as possessing both the knowledge (i.e.,
the diagnosis and the likely course of disease) and the mental capacity
to make an autonomous choice to seek PAS. But dementia is
different.
Before the onset of the dementia, the individual plainly has the
capacity to make a meaningful choice. But does the person have
anything like full information? It is correct, as proponents of
complete autonomy assert, that all choices we make about matters
that will take place in the future involve things we do not know;
188
none of us can see into the future. However, this situation seems
qualitatively different. I choose a mate to marry, expend large
amounts of money on education to prepare for a career, and book
cross-Atlantic flights on nonrefundable tickets. The reality is that
those refusing to accept that someone can rationally choose PAS but not making the same
claim about the rationality of those who refuse life-sustaining treatment "suggests that a
particular moral view about assisted dying is helping to demonstrate the existence of the
clinical disorder [undermining the capacity for rational suicide]").
183 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, NIGHT FALLS FAST: UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE (1999);
SUICIDE (Robert Emmet Long ed., H.W. Wilson Co. 1995) (reprinting various magazine
articles).
184 See N. Gregory Hamilton & Catherine A. Hamilton, Competing Paradigms of
Response to Assisted Suicide Requests in Oregon,- 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1060, 1060
(2005) ("Although physical illness may be a precipitating cause of despair, these patients
usually suffer from treatable depression and are always ambivalent about their desire for
death."). But see Chochinov & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 268 (explaining that the
correlation between suicidal ideation and hopelessness is greater than that between suicidal
ideation and depression); Sullivan et al., supra note 182, at 24, 28 (showing that the
terminally ill seeking PAS are not more likely to be depressed).
185 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "Catch-22" as:
[Al supposed law or regulation containing provisions which are mutually
frustrating . . . ; a set of circumstances in which one requirement, etc., is
dependent upon . . . the first. Freq. attrib., esp. as Catch-22 situation. [f. a
paradoxical rule postulated in the novel Catch-22 ... , by Joseph Heller....
2 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 973 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1989).
186 See Todd Goldberg, A Doctor Looks at Assisted Suicide, 1 NAVIGATOR 35 (1998).
187 See SOMERVILLE, supra note 7, at 317-20.
188 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 181-82.
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•. 189
none of these choices may turn out as I envisioned. Yet in the
future, my reality will still be my own, perceived through the mind
with which I have become familiar. The experience may have
"changed" me in some respects-from open to cautious, optimistic to
cynical, sloppy to careful about details, happy to sad, filled with love
to filled with anger, or vice versa-but the basic way my mind
functions as a mind will not have changed. I will just have
incorporated an additional or modified set of conceptual schemata
into my semantic memory.
With more than mild dementia this simply will not be true.
Thinking about being demented is not analogous to thinking about
any other future prospect. In this situation, you are literally
considering how you would think if your mechanisms for thinking
and communicating were radically different. I do not think that is
really possible. I can talk to others I respect about the realities of
marriage or a career as a graphic artist, 190 but I do not see how I can
do that with someone with dementia. It is not that they cannot tell
their stories-they can. 191 It is just that I can only look at their stories
through an undemented mind. Though I can feel empathy toward and
understand in a narrative sense what those with dementia are saying
when relating their experiences, I cannot really comprehend what it
would be like to have a radically differently functioning mind when
my only tool of comprehension is my ordinarily functioning mind. I
have an imagination, and actors and actresses are certainly capable of
convincingly "playing" a demented person, such as in the movie
Iris.1 9 2  These performances of the imagination are nevertheless
effectively external. Dementia is the object of the audience's
nondemented subjectivity. I can imagine the world of the demented
through my eyes but not through their brains.
Less philosophically, dementia sufferers are no more alike than
those without dementia. We are all unique individuals, demented or
not. Individuals thus experience dementia differently, 93 both due to
189 See Daniel Gilbert, Foreword to STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS, supra note 10, at xvi-
xvii.
190 See GILBERT, supra note 10, at 251-56.
191 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. But see Phinney, supra note 95, at 340
(explaining that those with mild to moderate dementia are unaware of or deny memory
deficits).
192 IRIS (Miramax Films 2001) (telling the story of Irish novelist Iris Murdoch as she
suffered from Alzheimer's disease).
193 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 13.
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the persona they are and to the specific area and magnitude of organic
damage to the brain. 194  Additionally, no matter how we position
ourselves on the philosophical issue of whether the "person" may or
may not "survive" when suffering serious dementia, it is true that
195
some people with dementia present dramatic personality changes.
On. the other hand, if we insist that individuals have full
information before choosing PAS, we run into another set of
problems. Once an individual is in the middle stages of Alzheimer's,
he or she has a pretty good sense of what it may be like to be
demented. The individual's competence to consent is quite another
issue. 196 Is it enough if the demented person says "I wish I was
dead?" This might just be a metaphorical way of expressing sadness
or even (treatable) depression. Even if meant at the moment, there is
no reason to believe the desire will persist. All of us have bad days,
and my experience visiting my demented mom in her Alzheimer's
residence made it clear to me that so do the demented. This is
particularly problematic because the person's feelings could be the
result of the care they are receiving, and thus a result of "malignant
psychology."
Moreover, all current and proposed statutes permitting PAS in
terminal illness require persistency of the request and consultation
with physicians (and mental health professionals if indicated). But a
person with middle- or late-stage dementia may not be able to
understand the information provided in a consultation,198 and have
great difficulty retaining or retrieving it from memory after the
consultations to "think it over." Also, because demented individuals
have lost their values framework in their semantic memory, 199 they
194 "The profiles of cognitive-communicative deficits of individuals with dementia
reflect the distribution of neuropathology associated with their disease." BAYLES &
TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 36.
195 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 290.
196 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 66 (stating that the demented person
experiences diminished comprehension of both written and spoken word). Interestingly, a
similar conundrum has been explored in the context of cult programming. See Richard
Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Uhgentle Persuasion Under the First
Amendment, 5i S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1977) (positing that in some settings, such as
religious brainwashing in cults, an individual begins with full capacity but lacks
knowledge; while later, when the individual acquires more knowledge, the capacity has
suffered diminution).
197 Existing PAS regimes require persistency in requesting PAS. See MITCHELL, supra
note 5, at 77-78 (The Netherlands); id. at 90 (Oregon).
198 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 180.
199 See id.
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will likely be unable to evaluate the information discussed, even if
they can somehow retain it in memory. This is not intended to
demean the dementia sufferer's capacity for understanding and ability
to make meaning. Realistically, however, the option of PAS would
be an intellectually, emotionally, psychologically, spiritually, and
existentially difficult conversation for any of us at our best. The
dementia sufferer is not at his or her best.
What about setting the line at something comparable to early-stage
Alzheimer's? Surely at that point, the person has a fairly vivid
picture of what lies in store for them while still retaining their
cognitive decision-making capacities. This superficially seems akin
to the "bright line" of "terminal illness with less than six months to
live." In fact, early-stage Alzheimer's has diagnostic criteria
including specific ranges of results from tests. Granted, this may be
200the period of time when the person is most frightened, aware of
being both in the world that was (and in which participation is still
somewhat possible) and the world that awaits (and into which
entrance is inevitable). However, this is the kind of decision for
which there is really no ideal time.
If we accepted this "early Alzheimer's" line,2°1 we would still have
to evaluate what this person could decide. For a number of reasons, I
don't think we would contemplate "kill me tomorrow." This is not
like the "six months to live" metaphor. No one really knows how to
200 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 122.
201 1 recognize that my construction of the semidemented state (where, on the one hand,
the person has some firsthand experience with dementia while, on the other, the person
retains sufficient competence to make an autonomous choice) will likely completely lose
its neat analytic .compass in real-life application. People often engage in denial or
obfuscating behavior at this stage. Thus, it is very common for people exhibiting early
signs of dementia to refuse to admit or acknowledge the condition, while becoming angry
when the possibility is suggested. MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 21. But see id. at
23' (indicating some feel better because they know it is a disease and they are not "stupid").
Conversely, families understandably are often equally reluctant to acknowledge the
deteriorating mental status of a loved one, especially since some memory loss is part of the
normal aging process. See id. at 4-5; BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 47-48. Will
early dementia sufferers want to sit down and discuss an advanced directive for a
condition they (and their families) are inclined to refuse to even acknowledge?
My family really did not face the fact that mom had dementia. We attributed her
behavior to everything but dementia. By the time we acknowledged her condition, she
was well past early-stage Alzheimer's.
How common will this be for others, especially considering the difficulty of assessing
the cognitive location of the person at any particular time along dementia's journey?
Plainly, it would be absurd to think of these stages as bright-lined, like crossing a national
border. It will be a combination of medicine, intuition, and storytelling about and with the
person.
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calculate at which point someone with dementia actually is
"terminal. ' 2°2 A demented person can live for a decade or more after
diagnosis. 2°3 Will we let someone have medical assistance in dying
because of the (perhaps justified) fear of what the future will hold,
though that future may not arise for many years? The person almost
certainly will worsen over time, but it will be in increments. In those
years, treatments, even a cure, could become available. In fact, some
treatments currently exist, 20 4 and with the threat of dementia to the
relatively affluent population bulge we call the baby boomers,
research and development in the area is only likely to increase.
Additionally, our reticence to allow PAS on the basis of the fear of
the future is understandable when one of our greatest overall concerns
is cabining the scope of its availability.
2 5
B. The Living Will as Delegation of Unrestrained Discretion over the
Life and Death of the Dementia Sufferer
What will we allow the dementia sufferer to decide? We might
consider, with the persistence of request and consultation
requirements analogous to those in PAS regimes for terminal
illnesses, permitting the mildly demented person to author a living
will or advanced directive laying out the terms under which the
dementia must have progressed for the person to be euthanized
(because the sufferer will not be able to understand at that point the
202 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 206.
203 For example, the middle stage of Alzheimer's can last from four to ten years.
BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 65.
204 See source cited supra note 20.
205 The PAS debate is infused with concerns that once permitted we will not be capable
of cabining its application:
Also, it would be difficult to limit suffering to pure physical pain .... Suffering is
far more complex. It is a mix of the physical, emotional, existential, and
psychological. Even suffering from physical pain has emotional and
psychological elements. . . . In fact, most terminal patients who seek assisted
suicide do not do so because of physical pain .... They are worn down from the
breakdown of their bodily functions, their inability to care for themselves,
inability to be part of a social community, the emotional and financial burden
they feel they are to their loved ones, and their general sense of hopelessness....
Of course, once law cuts the mooring from physical pain, how can it ignore
unremitting psychological suffering? Does a broken leg cause as much physical
(let alone emotional) pain as having a spouse suddenly announce that she is
leaving and wants a divorce?
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 61-62 (footnotes omitted); see also MITCHELL, supra note 5, at
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purpose of taking certain pills, or may have even forgotten how to
swallow, 2° 6 so PAS is not really a viable choice). As with everything
else in this area, a living will for medical termination of the life of a
demented person will not be unproblematic.
Practical issues spring forth about drafting, interpretation, and
implementation. Philosophical issues arise about privileging the
semicompetent over the incompetent self. Social issues emerge about
cultural coercion for the diagnosed demented to execute living wills
requesting euthanasia. Each of these problems merits careful
consideration.
Initially, there will be real challenges in drafting. What are the
terms or criteria that will trigger the medical termination of life? You
cannot use results on tests because they do not necessarily reflect the
extent of impairment, often overstating the deficits when compared to
207the actual functioning of the individual. Perhaps terms meaningful
to the individual's narrative will suffice: an inability to recognize any
immediate family and friends or a lack of orientation to self (e.g., not
responding to the person's own name). While this may initially seem
clear, it is not as simple and straightforward. The application of
advance directives is not considered in some abstracted space. Like
treatment, the decision always takes place in a concrete situation and
requires interpretation. 08 "When can the doctor be sure that the
patient no longer recognizes family and friends? Is this when their
names have been forgotten? Or when [patients] no longer seem to
regard them as people who mean something to them in some way?
How should we decide the latter?,
20 9
Even as to the sufferer not responding to her name, does the person
really understand who the name refers to but, because of damage to
certain segments of her brain, cannot express that understanding? Or
does the person fully understand but is angry at some treatment (e.g.,
ignored, spoken about in very insulting terms right in front of the
206 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
207 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 12, 14; Snyder, supra note 66, at 260.
208 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 189; Rebecca S. Dresser &
John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent
Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 237
(1989); J.J.M. van Delden, The Unfeasibility of Requests for Euthanasia in Advance
Directives, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 447, 448-49 (2004).
209 Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 189.
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person as if not in existance)? 210 How many times does the sufferer
need to fail to respond to a name before PAS takes its course and the
person is killed? Must the person be given a warning first in the
tradition of a warning shot? What if the sufferer cannot understand
the warning due to cognitive deficits, though understanding the name?
The interpretive point is clear.
The philosophical issue of privileging opposes a competent self
executing the directive and an incompetent self potentially being
executed by the terms of that same directive. I have posited a less
than fully competent person, but competent enough-a sort of
competent-light. The fact that someone gets lost on walks, forgets to
take messages, and increasingly struggles to find precisely descriptive
words does not mean, however, there is a lack of capacity to
understand the nature and consequence of a life or death decision. I
do not believe that posting a semicompetent author of a living will
changes the basic philosophical question about the legitimacy of
privileging the wishes of the semicompetent self over the incompetent
self.
Proponents of full autonomy argue the wishes of the autonomous
self (or semiautonomous in the case I am positing) are the only wishes
that matter as the seriously demented person cannot make
autonomous choices."' But this position presents, albeit in a
different form, the same set of assumptions underlying Lockean
philosophy and cognitive psychology-that only the self-enclosed,
self-conscious product of the rational mind counts.
If the semicompetent and the demented persons were literally
different "selves," then the advanced directive would, in effect, be a
contract for murder by hire. But that characterization of literally
different selves does not reflect in any way how I, or anyone I know,
see the world. In the end, Mom was very confused and generally not
accessible to those around her, but she was unequivocally still Mom.
Still, I have no doubt that the semicompetent self and the incompetent
self might well have very different interests. 2 12 They might even be
210 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 290-91. For another scholar who believes that the
demented should be respected for who they are now, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and
the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L.
REV. 1139, 1166-67 (1991); John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality of Life: A Response to
Professor Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REV. 1243, 1245, 1248 (1991).
211 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 236; Widdershoven & Berghmans,
supra note 126, at 181-82.
212 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 236.
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more dissimilar than those of the sixteen-year-old self and the fifty-
five-year-old version.
Entering into this philosophical fray, Professor Ronald Dworkin
2 11
would lay down a card on the table that he contends allows the past
self to trump the present. He names this card "precedential
autonomy.",2 14 The previously expressed desire of the competent (or
semicompetent in my conception) self trumps because it is an
expression of who the person really is. This person has tried to create
a coherent life, a life with integrity. It is their autonomous decision as
to how they want that life to play out ("I am someone who is capable,
grounded, realistic. I am not someone who is helplessly deluded"), 215
and the decision provides a sense of comfort to them to believe that
When people become incompetent and seriously ill, however, their interests
may radically change. With their reduced mental and physical capacities, what
was. once of extreme importance to them no longer matters, while things that
were previously of little moment assume much greater significance. An
existence that seems demeaning and unacceptable to the competent person may
still be of value to the incompetent patient, whose abilities, desires and interests
have so greatly narrowed.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for competent individuals to predict their
interests in future treatment situations when they are incompetent because their
needs and interests will have so radically changed. As a result, the directives
they issue for future situations of incompetency, though they reflect their current
needs and interests, may have little relevance to their needs and interests once
they become incompetent. Indeed, their advance directives may even be
detrimental to their interests once in that state.
Id.; see also Tony Hope, Advdnce Directives About Medical Treatment: Making Up One's
Mind While One Still Has a Mind, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 398, 398 (1992).
213 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 18.
214 Id. at 224, 226, 232. For an excellent argument that Dworkin defines autonomy too
narrowly, so as to incorrectly exclude the demented, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented, in DWORKIN AND His CRITICS
WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 195, 202-03 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
215 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 227-28. On the other hand, the healthy have
trouble envisioning anything positive in the life of the ill:
The tendency that causes us to overestimate the happiness of Californians also
causes us to underestimate the happiness of people with chronic illnesses or
disabilities. . . .For example, when sighted people imagine being blind, they
seem to forget that blindness is not a full-time job. Blind people can't see, but
they do most of the things that sighted people do-they go on picnics, pay their
taxes, listen to music, get stuck in traffic-and thus they are just as happy as
sighted people are. They can't do everything sighted people can do .... and thus
blind and sighted lives are not identical. But whatever a blind person's life is
like, it is about much more than blindness. And yet, when sighted people
imagine being blind, they fail to imagine all the other things that such a life
might be about, hence they mispredict how satisfying such a life can be.
GILBERT, supra note 10, at 114-15.
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this advanced directive will ensure that the ending of their life story
will be consistent with who they "really are."
The core premise underlying Dworkin's notion of precedential
autonomy is that the autonomous person chooses the "critical
interests"' 2 16 (central elements of our lives) that define the life story of
who that person is. It violates that autonomy if a nonrational (and
thereby nonautonomous) version subsequently alters that story.27
I disagree for two reasons. First, the notion of autonomy as a
means of creating a coherent "story" of ourselves to be left behind,
etched in the memory of history, is a false one mired in illusion.
Every philosophical perspective on narrative as the construct
establishing identity was oriented around the fundamental conception
that, though We are active participants in the creation of a self-
narrative, the story is in no sense ours alone. Limited and
circumscribed by social conventions, given meaning through
interaction with others, and being in part a function of how others
choose to see and "position" us, the notion that we can autonomously
author our story belies the reality that our stories are created of and in
218the world, and that we have scant control over the external world.
216 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 201-07. For an excellent summary of Dworkin's
position, see Shiffrin, supra note 214, at 197, which states:
Dworkin maintains that a demented person qua demented person lacks a critical
interest in continuing to live. Demented people may have experiential interests
in their lives. They may have good or bad experiences within them; they can, for
instance, enjoy comfort and reassurance or feel pain and fear (p. 227). They
cannot, however, take a view of their lives as a whole, and hence they cannot
form opinions about their critical interests. That is, they cannot assess what
renders their lives a success or a failure and what, within a life, pays proper heed
to the sanctity of life (pp. 201, 230). Moreover, Dworkin thinks that not only are
demented people incapable of understanding what is in their critical interests,
they cannot do anything to further their critical interests. He claims they are
incapable of the acts and attachments that give life value. Value, he notes,
"cannot be poured into a life from the outside; it must be generated by the person
whose life it is, and this is no longer possible for [the demented person]" (p.
230).
217 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 227-28; Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note
126, at 181. But see Thomas May, Slavery, Commitment, and Choice: Do Advance
Directives Reflect Autonomy?, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 358, 358 (1999)
(arguing that an advance directive that relinquishes future judgment is inconsistent with
autonomy because it is the "ability to re-evaluate one's commitment to the second order
strategy [i.e., a document such as an advance directive requiring PAS if one becomes
demented] that is key for the strategy's consistency with autonomy").
218 See supra notes 38, 39, 40 and accompanying text.
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Further, there is no reason why the chapters of our stories cannot be
219
rewritten, altered, or added by a now "mad" author.
Second, one may fairly ask why the cognitive is consistently
privileged over the affective in constructs of personal identity.
220
Perhaps on a Darwinian level one may feel cognitive capacities are
central to our survival, yet equally central would seem to be our
instincts and intuition about things in the world. "Emotional
intelligence" is not some fringe notion. Rather, it is accepted as a
221
capability that is necessary for success in our modem workplace. 1
Also, language itself does not find its sole function in rational
dialogue. Of course language can include a "representational
dimension" in which one communicates substantive information to
222
another, but this is not necessarily so. Language can be purely
''expressive," containing no representational dimension and instead
serving as a device to establish "the kind of rapport which is peculiar
to us linguistic animals. 223 From the mere fact we speak, there is a
connection. That connection exists whether speech takes the form of
a completely unfamiliar foreign language or the seemingly
unconnected ramblings of some demented individual. Even when my
mother could not express a single coherent phrase, there were times
when she would hold my hands, utter some unintelligible string of
phrases, and smile, and "the meaning" she expressed and connection I
experienced was immeasurably more significant than if she had given
an articulate analysis of the history and current appropriateness of the
electoral college.
But my objections go far beyond parting with moral philosophers.
They reside in the specter of a future world in which staggering
numbers of old, demented people are put to death. If we accept
precedential autonomy, we will come back to problems of
219 In questioning Professor Dworkin's concept of a coherent life narrative, Rebecca
Dresser raises a similar thought: Can one's life story have a "surprise ending"? Rebecca
Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, HASTINGS CENTER
REP.,Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 32, 36 (1995).
220 See Allen & Coleman, supra note 143, at 218 (highlighting the value of the
"spiritual" nature, which is unrelated to cognition); Post, supra note 115, at 227;
Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 182. In fact, one author terms
"hypercognitive" as a form of moral blindness. See Post, supra note 115, at 223, 231.
221 See, generally DANIEL COLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (2006); GERALD
MATTHEWS ET AL., EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: SCIENCE AND MYTH (2002).
222 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 22.
223 Id.; see also CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 248, 260 (1985).
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interpretation. That is obvious. What is less obvious is that we
inevitably will have created a regime of absolute, life-and-death
"interpretive discretion." My friend's mother was severely demented
and lived in a care facility. She was cheerful, loved to garden
throughout her life, and, in the facility, still daily puttered about a
small plot of lovely flowers. When my friend, ("Bill") and his wife of
eighteen years ("Sue") visited, the mother would be very, very
pleasant when they came up to her. She also had absolutely no idea
who they were. One day she said to Sue, while Bill was standing
right there, "Dearie, too bad you didn't know my son, Bill. He's been
dead quite a while. Never married, too bad. You'd have liked him."
If my friend's mom had executed an advance directive, contingent
on not knowing close family, then it is fair to say the critical terms
were met and mom would now be subject to having a lethal injection
after dinner. There is not any possibility, however, that a remotely
nonpsychotic health care professional on this planet would kill this
delightful woman because of some piece of paper in the file."' What
would happen is "interpretive discretion." The likely interpretation
would take the form of something like the following. The fact that she
talked about her son and marriage, making clear that Bill and Sue
would have liked each other, implies that on some level she
comprehends the linkage between Bill and Sue. Saying her son is
dead, moreover, is likely a reference to her sense that she and her son
are lost to each other because of her dementia. And so the
interpretation would go.
But what if my friend's mom was nasty and always seemed
unhappy? Would her interaction with her son and daughter-in-law
have been similarly interpreted? And what if it was not and that
contrary interpretation was in fact incorrect? There will be no appeals
for nasty mom, followed by years of habeas corpus petitions making
their way first through the state and then the federal system.
Unpleasant mom will be dead by nightfall. Of course, the fact that
224 1 confess to agreeing with Professor Kadish that, in these circumstances,
"compassion" trumps autonomy. See Kadish, supra note 110, at 876; accord Shiffrin,
supra note 214, at 210 ("Likewise, it seems barbaric to ignore the experiential interests of
people whose lives are filled with simple joys and delight and to cut these lives off short-
to kill them-so that the entire life of [the individual who executed the living will] is
unsullied by a lingering period of intellectual deterioration and decline.").
Professor Dworkin responds to this by saying that, while carrying out the living will is
necessary to respect autonomy, other moral values would trump in such a situation.
Ronald Dworkin, Reply: Seana Valentine Shiffrin, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS WITH
REPLIES BY DwoRKIN, supra note 214, at 370, 370.
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even unpleasant mom is paying her bills in a high-priced care facility
would likely have a strong influence on the interpretive stance of the
members of the care facility, although these are not likely to be the
people authorized to carry out the actual euthanasia. But what if the
family pressures their doctor to invoke the directive (respect for
mom's dignity, more money in the-now almost immediate-
inheritance)? Again, there will be no check on interpretive discretion
so long as everyone (not counting the demented person) agrees on the
interpretation. Only in the case of strong disagreement will there be
any possibility that courts will get even a whiff of the situation.
Now change venues. We are walking into a dementia ward funded
by an HMO or a vast geriatric, dementia facility in a state mental
hospital. The patients have little or no money and most no family or
outside support. Is there any doubt how the story of unpleasant mom
will end?
There is a final sense in which the specter of coercion rises as a
very serious issue. I am thinking less about individual family
members or physicians, though that certainly could happen. What I
find more concerning is the possibility that there will emerge an
understanding that would achieve the status of social expectation,
225even social obligation. The litany will proceed as follows:
dementia sufferers use up a significant amount of our society's very
226limited funds for health care. We have to make difficult decisions,
triaging our scarce health care resources. This country has provided
you with an extraordinary amount of freedom and a materially
comfortable life, which is the envy of most of the world. We are now
asking little from you-in fact, almost nothing. Now that you have
been diagnosed with dementia, we ask that you fill out and sign this
advanced directive form. And when the time comes, it will not be
like you are killing yourself. You will not even exist; only an empty
shell or a vegetable will mark where you once lived, inhabiting your
body and swallowing up scarce health care resources that otherwise
would go to treating sick young children or finding a cure for
Alzheimer's.
225 This sentiment in fact was explicitly and publicly expressed by then Colorado
Governor Richard Lamm: "Elderly people who are terminally ill have a 'duty to die and
get out of the way' instead of trying to prolong their lives by artificial means." Gov.
Lamm Asserts Elderly, if Very Ill, Have "Duty to Die," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1984, at
A16. But see Oppenheimer, supra note 179.
226 See supra notes 29, 30.
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I am not envisioning that this message will be posted somewhere in
every caf6 selling latt's. But within our cultural mind, this ."message"
could become accepted dogma, particularly if sheer costs conjoin with
a cultural belief that the severely demented are effectively dead, that
their lives are indistinguishable from cabbages.
C. Why an Absolute Ban on Using Living Wills to Facilitate Assisted
Suicide as a Response to Dementia Is Necessary
Even given all that has been said, if a relatively small group of
baby boomers wished to execute these agreements in order to provide
some peace of mind, that would not be problematic. 227 After all, a
significant percentage of those prescribed lethal pills in Oregon, one
of the few states that allows euthanasia, do not actually take them; the
mere existence of the option perhaps permits them to relax.228 Of
course with an advanced directive for PAS, demented persons will not
have the ability to change their minds like those who can choose not
to take the pills. Rather, they will be relying on the (interpretive)
kindness of strangers.
Though I have no personal problem with this notion, there seems
an insurmountable policy problem with permitting even these "few
baby boomers" to create advanced directives. There are no principled
basis or empirical guess (e.g., that only certain types of individuals,
small in number, execute such living wills; or that information about
the actions of these few would not reach the mass of our media-
drenched society) that would ensure these actions would be limited to
the few. And, if signing advanced directives becomes a cultural
norm, then I have a serious problem because of unfettered
"interpretive discretion." While this may also apply to current living
wills, which include "Do Not Resuscitate" provisions, there is a huge
difference with dementia. Living wills that permit tubes to be pulled
and treatments not to be carried out (e.g., not treating pneumonia
when a person is dying of cancer or a ninety-year-old patient is
completely demented and has serious heart difficulties), are all
cabined to a very circumscribed set of conditions-gravely ill people,
227 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 237; Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians'
Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 563
(2000).
228 One inference from this is mere existence of the opportunity to end their lives allows
them to relax. See BARRY ROSENFELD, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE
INTERFACE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND MEDICAL ETHICS 152-53 (2004).
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229generally in hospitals, dependent on machines for survival. In
contrast, the environment in which PAS for dementia could be carried
out is vast.23°
Some scholars have suggested that advanced directives could be
used as a heuristic device (a "tool") rather than a mandatory
231device. Used in conjunction with consultation with family and
friends, attempted discussion with "the patient," and input by
physician and-caregiver, the decision whether to end the person's life
232
would be made. While this may sound good, if PAS is legal and
advanced directives for dementia are the norm, this seemingly rational
and philosophically supportable2 33  approach generally will be
meaningless. For many, there will be no one with whom to consult,
229 Persons currently have at least a common law, and perhaps even a constitutional,
right to refuse otherwise lifesaving medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-74 (1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). One has
no comparable right to assistance in dying other than the removal of life-maintaining
medical equipment. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Nonetheless,
the right to refuse lifesaving treatment is very significant given that currently eighty
percent of people die in hospitals or nursing homes. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302. About
seventy percent of those die as the result of some treatment decision, such as withdrawing
support and not providing treatment. George P. Smith II, Restructuring the Principle of
Medical Futility, 11 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 9, 9 (1995); Marcia Angell, Helping Desperately
Ill People to Die, in REGULATING HOW WE DIE: THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 11, at 3, 12. A
somewhat different estimate (though limited to hospitals) shows that fifty percent of
deaths in hospitals from nonemergency cases result from withdrawing lifesaving
treatment. Robert T. Hall, Final Act: Sorting Out the Ethics of Physician-Assisted Suicide,
54 HUMANIST 10, 10 (1994).
230 Some have suggested that a living will, which requests cessation of all artificial (or
spoon) feeding and hydration if the individual's dementia reaches the point that the person
no longer recalls how to eat or swallow, would be appropriate. See STANLEY A. TERMAN,
THE BEST WAY TO SAY GOODBYE: A LEGAL PEACEFUL CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE
201-06 (2007). If this is the limit of using living wills in conjunction with dementia, I
would not be extremely concerned. The required status of not recalling how to eat, drink,
or swallow generally correlates with end-stage dementia and provides a fairly
circumscribed, somewhat objective standard for implementation of the living will. If,
however, refusal of lifesaving treatment were tied to some level of cognitive deterioration
(e.g., cannot recognize immediate family), then I would strongly object. Even limiting
PAS through living wills to cases where the person no longer recalls how to swallow,
however, will still leave the serious problem of total interpretative discretion will be the
same.
231 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 180, 184, 190.
232 Id. at 182-85. But cf Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 239-40 (discussing
advance directives and withdrawal of treatment for two conscious, but incompetent,
dementia patients and questioning whether such withdrawal "actually serves the
incompetent patient's existing interests").
233 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 188-90.
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no one to watch over the person For the demented, whether the more
affluent in private care facilities or the poor in geriatric wards in state
mental hospitals, a large percentage have no one really involved in
their lives, notwithstanding some infrequent visits.2 3 4 So what will
happen? For those without anyone, total interpretive discretion, based
in part on subjective feelings and relevant costs, will determine
whether the person will live or die-a bit like thumbs up or down in
the old Roman Coliseum. And, perversely, the very "malignancy" of
the institutional treatment may cause the demented person to appear
less. worthy of life.
IV
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In previous work, I have argued that suicide and assisted suicide in
235the context of the terminally ill is not immoral . I feel basically the
same about dementia. My concerns go to different matters, matters as
tightly woven together as a good rug: our serious societal
misconceptions about dementia and the demented and the malignant
interrelationship between our misconceived "labels/positioning" and
the functioning of the demented in response.
As a result, I am going to take a bold rhetorical stance.
"Pollyanna" is a label intended to totally discredit any position that is
seen as too positive, too dependent on believing in the positive
possibilities of human nature. In this rhetorical move, too positive or
too believing is equated with nonpragmatic, nonrealistic. But I
236believe that well-considered Pollyannaism is pragmatic and, from
our lived experience, the most promising stance. We, as a society,
should never permit PAS for dementia. Instead, we should (1)
alleviate fear--dementia is not a phrase to incite terror; it is the result
of a disease like others, and one needs to understand what really
happens to those who suffer from it. We should (2) educate-help
our- society realize that the demented can understand and
communicate in their own way and that these people are not empty
234 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing the range of reasons
people do not visit dementia sufferers in institutions).
235 See M1TCHELL, supra note 5, at 129.
236 A term derived from "[t]he name of the heroine of stories written by Eleanor
Hodgman Porter (1868-1920), American children's author, used with allusion to her skill
at the "glad game" of finding cause for happiness in the most disastrous situations; one
who is unduly optimistic or achieve happiness through self-delusion." 12 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 43 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1989).
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shells or cabbages. And we should (3) spend-invest a fraction of
what we currently spend on sports stadiums on research for treatment
and (hopefully) cures for Alzheimer's and other forms of dementia.
This is a call to recognize our shared humanity, to kneel down in the
garden with my friend's demented mother, and share the peace of the
cool, rich soil.
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